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Foreign ownership and market power in banking: 
Evidence from a world sample 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Ownership and competition in the banking sector are policy concerns around the world that 
are rarely comprehensively examined. For 131 countries and 13 years we match bank 
ownership with over 50,000 bank-year estimates of individual bank market power. At the 
individual bank level, ownership does not explain market power. At the country level, on the 
other hand, foreign bank ownership has a positive and significant impact on bank market 
power because foreign banks enter through mergers or acquisitions and not through 
greenfield investments. We also find that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on 
market power is considerably weaker in countries with well-capitalized banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Globalization is changing the ownership of firms around the world in many sectors, and the 
banking sector is no exception. Claessens and Van Horen (2014) for example report that the 
percentage of foreign banks present in a country on average increased from 21% in 1995 to 
35% in 2009, and in certain developing countries this increase was substantially higher. 
Foreign banks may not only enhance the availability of credit by directly lending to 
domestic firms or households, but also spur competition and strengthen the financial system, 
thus indirectly benefiting all borrowers (including those that do not directly borrow from 
foreign banks). At the same time, foreign banks often enter a market through a merger or an 
acquisition, in the process altering the market power of all banks involved. 
Yet, despite the importance of foreign bank presence in many countries around the 
world, the impact of their presence on market power has not been investigated 
comprehensively. In this paper we therefore construct a new data set that includes 
comprehensive bank-year observations of market power of individual banks in most countries 
around the world. We then study the effects of foreign bank ownership on our newly-
constructed estimates of individual bank market power. 
Our paper addresses two crucial questions. First, we investigate if the ownership 
status, i.e., foreign or domestic, of individual banks has a direct impact on their own market 
power. We call this the direct effect of (foreign) bank ownership. Second, we analyze the 
extent to which foreign bank presence at the country (and year) level has an impact on the 
market power of all individual banks. That is we consider whether a banking system with a 
higher foreign bank presence in general induces changes in individual bank market power. 
We call this the spillover effect 
To identify these effects we adopt a two-step procedure. First, we estimate the 
individual market power of virtually all banks in the world for which financial statements are 
available and comparable. For our analysis, we rely on both the Lerner index, which 
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measures deviations of prices from marginal cost, and on the adjusted-Lerner index, which is 
similarly calculated but relaxes the assumption that banks function in a fully efficient manner. 
For the calculation of both indices we first estimate the marginal cost with a semiparametric 
technique that allows for greater flexibility in the production technology of banks compared 
to the extant parametric techniques. Thus, changes in the structure of the production 
technology across banks, countries and time are better accounted for. In this way we improve 
on the estimation of marginal cost and provide a new index of market power for the 
maximum amount of time and number of banking systems possible. 
In the second step, we examine the potency of the aforementioned direct and spillover 
effects. Using the database constructed by Claessens and van Horen (2014) we classify all 
banks in our sample at each point in time as either domestic or foreign-owned. Yet, despite 
the relevant and dynamic character of our ownership classification we fail to find in any of 
the empirical exercises we do a statistically significant (and/or economically relevant) direct 
effect of foreign ownership. It seems indeed there is no difference in market power between 
domestic and foreign-owned banks. 
Next, we aggregate foreign bank presence in each country and for each year. In this 
case, and even when controlling for the (seemingly irrelevant) direct effect, we find that 
higher foreign bank presence (at the country-year level) increases the market power of the 
average bank in the industry (whether it is domestic or foreign-owned) in a statistically 
significant and robust manner. This effect is also economically relevant. For example, an 
increase in foreign bank presence from 17% in 1997 to 25% in 2009 (which is the increase 
observed for the average country) resulted in an increase in the Lerner index of 0.08 points 
(for the average Lerner index in our sample of 0.22 this is equivalent to a 36% increase). 
These findings are further robust to the measurement of market power using the country-level 
Lerner and Boone indicators from the World Bank’s database as our measures of market 
power. 
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 We also analyze some theoretically plausible heterogeneous effects in the identified 
positive relation between foreign bank presence and market power. We find that the positive 
effect of foreign bank presence on bank market power is smaller for better capitalized banks. 
Further, we show that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on banks’ market power is 
primarily due to their entry through a merger or acquisition rather than through a greenfield 
investment. Indeed, in our sample, two out of three foreign banks are established in the host 
country through a merger or acquisition and this is seemingly the main channel leading to the 
positive impact of foreign bank presence on market power. The only country characteristic 
among those examined that somewhat reduces the potency of the positive impact of foreign 
bank presence on bank market power is the high difference in the financial-statement 
transparency between the host and the origin country. 
Our study is the first to investigate the effect of foreign bank presence on individual 
bank market power, along certain bank and industry characteristics that affect the potency of 
this effect. Our finding on the positive spillover effect is in contrast with the only two 
existing empirical studies on this issue. Claessens and Laeven (2004), using a sample of 50 
countries, and Jeon, Olivero, and Wu (2011), using a sample of only Asian and Latin 
American countries, analyze the impact of foreign bank presence on bank competition at the 
country (and year) level. Both studies find a negative (positive) relation between foreign 
ownership and market power (competition). 
Yet, there are two differentiating characteristics of our study (vis-à-vis theirs) that 
may well explain our unique findings. First, the semiparametric approach used for the 
estimation of marginal cost and, thus, of market power, is less sensitive to the choice of a 
functional form for the technology of banks. That is, our method allows for a very flexible 
cost structure and, thus, increased econometric efficiency in our market power estimates. 
Second, and thanks to the foreign ownership data by Claessens and van Horen (2014) and our 
estimates of market power, we have a bank-level market power independent variable and the 
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broadest coverage compared to all existing studies, with observations from 131 countries 
over the period 1997 to 2009. In contrast, existing studies focus on the relation between 
foreign bank entry and competition/ market power at the country-year level. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
arguments linking foreign bank ownership with bank market power and the explicit paths that 
can influence this relation. Section 3 discusses the data set on the banks’ market power along 
with the way this is estimated, and also provides definitions and information on the foreign 
bank ownership and the control variables. Section 4 discusses the empirical identification 
procedure and the estimation results. Section 5 summarizes the results and provides policy 
implications. 
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
There are two main channels through which a relationship between foreign bank ownership 
and bank market power may work. The first is simply that foreign banks may have different 
levels of market power compared to domestic banks. We call this the “direct effect” of 
foreign ownership on market power. The second effect is related to the fact that foreign bank 
presence in general can cause changes to banks’ market power. We call this the “spillover 
effect” of foreign bank presence on bank market power. 
It is not a priori obvious whether the direct effect will be positive or negative. On the 
one hand, foreign banks have access to alternative sources of funds through their affiliates in 
their country of origin and could bring in more specialized and sophisticated banking 
products. Further, these banks are usually more cost-efficient (Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 
2005; Degryse, Havrylchyk, Jurzyk, and Kozak, 2012), as they have access to better 
technology, especially if their country of origin has a more developed banking sector 
compared to the one they penetrate. These attributes of foreign banks could allow them to 
exercise greater market power than domestic banks. On the other hand, foreign banks 
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entering a new market may face an informational handicap, at least in the initial period 
following their entry, that could force them to price their products more competitively and 
offer better loan terms to attract customers from existing banks (Sengupta, 2007). Such 
behavior would result in a lower price-cost margin, which is a common measure of market 
power. 
The direction of the spillover effect is again a priori ambiguous. Foreign bank entry 
can stimulate competition in domestic markets in general and put downward pressure on 
prices and margins (Levine, 1996; Beck, Ioannidou, and Schafer, 2012). This effect is likely 
to be particularly strong in the case of greenfield entry, which adds competitors, and less so in 
the case of acquisitions, where a foreign bank takes over an existing domestic bank. 
However, there are also forces leading to a positive relation between foreign bank 
presence and bank market power. First, if the efficiency advantage of foreign banks forces 
domestic banks to become more efficient themselves, this could lead to higher margins for all 
banks if the cost savings are not passed on through lower prices. The same effect could arise 
if foreign banks are able to exploit their superior know-how and come to dominate domestic 
markets in new innovative financial products. If this is accompanied by a large scale and 
rapid penetration of foreign banking, this mechanism will naturally result to a monopolistic 
behavior of many banks in the industry and the loss of competitive pricing of the 
monopolistic products, at least for some period of time. 
Clearly, the nexus between foreign bank ownership and market power could be 
affected by a number of bank- and market-specific characteristics. At the bank level, a 
comparative advantage of the foreign banks usually comes from their access to capital from 
their parent companies in the origin country. Given that capital requirements are now in place 
in virtually all countries, this advantage of foreign banks can translate into lower cost of 
capital and improved efficiency. However, if the capital market in the domestic banking 
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system is deep and domestic banks are well-capitalized, this will weaken the implied positive 
relation between foreign ownership and market power. 
The opposite effect could prevail if there is a big difference between foreign and 
domestic banks in the way they finance their own lending. Usually, domestic banks have 
established long-term relationships with their depositors and they tend to have higher deposits 
to assets ratios. In contrast, foreign banks have access to potentially less expensive liquid 
funds from their parent companies or the international interbank market. The practical 
implication of this status quo is that the banks with high ratios of deposits to total assets and 
limited access to cheaper sources of funds, will have a disadvantage in providing competitive 
terms of lending. In other words, a potentially positive link between foreign bank ownership 
and market power should be exacerbated when domestic banks rely mainly on deposits as 
their source of loanable funds. 
As discussed above, a natural differentiating factor in the impact of foreign ownership 
on competition is the mode of foreign bank entry. Greenfield entry increases the number of 
banks in the domestic banking industry, which by itself promotes competition, while 
penetration through an acquisition leaves the number of banks unchanged (Martinez Peria 
and Mody, 2004). Claeys and Hainz (2014) further highlight that a foreign bank enters 
through a greenfield investment only if its advantage in screening new applicant firms, due to 
e.g. better screening technology, compensates its disadvantage of having no information 
about incumbent firms. If a foreign bank enters via an acquisition, it acquires a credit 
portfolio that contains information about the quality of incumbent firms. In addition, the 
acquired bank can generate information by screening applicants and this generates an 
informational advantage for foreign banks entering via acquisitions. The mode of entry, thus, 
determines the distribution of information between foreign and domestic banks, which affects 
the degree of competition in the banking industry. For example, in Mexico during the so-
called tequila crisis, foreign banks entered almost entirely through the acquisition of existing 
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domestic banks, thus preserving the oligopolistic structure of the industry (Moguillansky, 
Stuart, and Vergara, 2004). 
The relation between market power and foreign ownership can also be affected by a 
number of characteristics of the banking industry. The study by Mian (2006) is the first to 
note that greater geographical and cultural distance from the foreign bank’s home country 
increases the bias of foreign bank lending toward larger and hard-information firms. This 
effect should be more potent when the domestic banking system is characterized by relative 
lack of transparency compared to country of origin of the foreign bank. The lack of 
transparency in the banking sector is usually attributed to the lack of self-discipline, 
especially in terms of information disclosure of financial statements to the public (Cihak, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-Cheraghlou, 2012; Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 
2008). 
Besides the two papers that are directly relevant to our work (Claessens and Laeven, 
2004; Jeon, Olivero, and Wu, 2011), our study is also related to two large, but rather separate, 
literatures one on foreign bank participation and one on banking competition and market 
power. Claessens (2006) reviews and refines the full set of arguments linking the two 
literatures and identifies the limitations of the existing empirical evidence. Among other 
studies, Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez (2003) and Beck, Ioannidou, and Schafer 
(2012) find that foreign bank entry improves credit conditions for enterprises of all sizes, and 
Berger, Hasan, and Klapper (2004) suggest that a larger foreign bank presence leads to a 
greater availability of credit to SMEs (see also Giannetti and Ongena, 2009, 2012). 
Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel (2008) and Beck and Martinez Peria (2010) offer a 
less positive view of foreign bank participation by highlighting that foreign banks tend to 
select borrowers with greater creditworthiness (“cherry pick”), while domestic banks are left 
with lower quality borrowers. This, in turn can hurt the profitability of the domestic banks 
and their willingness to lend. Empirical research on the relative performance of domestic and 
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foreign banks has produced contradictory results, with some studies finding that foreign 
banks do better and other studies reporting stronger performance of domestic banks; see 
Degryse and Ongena (2008) and Chen and Liao (2011) for reviews of this evidence. 
 
3. Variables and data 
The empirical model used to study the relation between foreign bank ownership and bank 
market power is of the following form:  
Litc = δ0 + δ1 Li,t-1,c + φ FOi,t-1,c + θ FPt-1,c + δ2 Bitc + δ3 Xt-1,c + εitc .  (1) 
In equation (1) the market power L of bank i at year t and country c is regressed on its annual 
lag, a dummy variable foreign-owned (FO) that is observed at the bank-year level and takes 
the value one when a bank is foreign-owned and zero otherwise, an indicator foreign 
presence (FP) that is observed at the country-year level and measures the extent of foreign 
bank presence, a vector of bank characteristics B observed at the bank-year level, and a 
vector of variables X observed at the country-year level. εitc is the stochastic disturbance. 
 Foreign-owned and foreign presence enter equation (1) with a one-year lag, and the 
same holds for all the variables observed at the country-year level. This timing is derived 
from the fact that country-level changes, like structural, regulatory, and macroeconomic 
developments, take time to reach the market and have a bearing on the market power of 
individual banks. In addition, modelling our two foreign ownership variables in this way 
allows mitigating the engogeneity problem stemming from reverse causality. In contrast, all 
the bank-level control variables B enter equation (1) contemporaneously. These variables 
have a direct and contemporaneous bearing on the cost structure and the pricing decisions of 
banks, as they describe individual bank strategies that can change in the short-term. 
The rest of this section discusses our measures for bank market power, the foreign 
ownership variables and the control variables used in our study. The correlation coefficients 
between the explanatory variables that were used as determinants of bank market power do 
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not give rise to any multicollinearity concerns (further left unreported). In Table 1 we provide 
detailed definitions for the variables used to estimate equation (1) and in Table 2 we report 
summary statistics for these variables. 
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
3.1. Measures of market power 
The measurement of market power has received much attention in the economics literature 
since the importance of imperfectly competitive markets was first recognized in the 1930s. 
The Lerner index (1934) remains to this day a popular measure of market power (and of 
competition) thanks to its simplicity and transparency. It is defined as: 
,itc itcitc
itc
P MC
L
P

           (2) 
where P and MC are the price of bank output and the marginal cost of the production of this 
output. The Lerner index ranges between zero and one, with zero corresponding to perfect 
competition and larger values reflecting more market power (and less competition). The 
index can also be negative if P < MC, which is of course not sustainable in the long run. 
The Lerner index measures departures from the competitive benchmark of marginal 
cost pricing. This makes it a simple and intuitively appealing index of market power. The 
index has also often been used as a measure of competition. Although the link between 
market power and competition might seem obvious, it has been shown that the Lerner index 
does not always point in the expected direction when competitive conditions change (Stiglitz, 
1989; Boone, 2008). For this reason we interpret the Lerner index as primarily a measure of 
market power, with a further connection to competition a natural but not entirely 
uncontroversial possibility. 
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Alternative measures of market power and competition include the H-statistic (Panzar 
and Rosse 1987) and the profit elasticity (Griffith, Boone, and Harrison 2005). The H-statistic 
has been widely used in banking studies, but has a shortcoming when it is used as a 
continuous measure of market power. As Bikker, Shaffer, and Spierdijk (2012) point out, the 
H-statistic maps the various degrees of market power only weakly and thus cannot be viewed 
as a continuous variable. The profit elasticity (or Boone indicator) is a relatively new concept 
that has been used in several recent studies but has also received some criticism. For 
example, Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke (2010) show that it makes critical assumptions 
relative to firm size and to market definition. 
Given that the alternative indices of market power and competition are still open to 
some critique, we favor the Lerner index and its variants as our proxy for market power. 
However, we also employ as robustness checks the H-statistic and the Boone indicator. The 
main reason for our choice is that the Lerner index allows for variation at the bank level. This 
advantage increases the richness of our empirical analysis as it allows us to study both the 
direct and the spillover effects. Also, as Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens (2013) readily argue, 
the Lerner index is a good proxy for current and future proﬁts stemming from pricing power, 
while it is not constrained by the extent of the market. In contrast, other bank-level measures, 
such as the market share or Tobin’s q, can lead to measurement error because they also 
capture the rents extracted from being too-big-to-fail. Moreover, the Lerner index captures 
both the impact of pricing power on the asset side of the banks’ balance sheet and the 
elements associated with the cost efficiency on their liability side. This is of particular 
importance in our analysis because of the implications of the foreign bank ownership for both 
the costs and the revenues of banks, as highlighted in Section 2. 
Computation of the Lerner index requires knowledge of the marginal cost. When such 
information is unavailable (as in most empirical data sets), the marginal cost can be estimated 
using econometric methods. A popular approach has been to estimate a translog cost function 
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and take its derivative to obtain the marginal cost. Some recent work has shown that it is 
possible to improve on this methodology with semiparametric or nonparametric methods that 
allow for more flexibility in the functional form (Delis, Iosifidi, and Tsionas, 2013). We 
follow this new literature and estimate the cost function using a partial linear smooth 
coefficient (PLSC) model. We provide all the details for the estimation of marginal cost and 
the data cleaning process in Appendix A and here we just outline the advantages of this 
approach. 
Most importantly, the semiparametric nature of the method implies that no 
assumption regarding the functional form of the cost equation is made globally. An 
assumption is just made “in local neighborhoods of observations.” This is important as it is 
usually quite difficult for the researcher to be certain about the validity of the chosen 
functional form. In their survey paper, Reiss and Wolak (2007) are very skeptical about using 
a specific functional form to estimate a cost equation without a prior analysis of the data, 
since an “incorrect” cost equation can bias the estimation and inference of marginal cost to an 
unknown magnitude and direction. The flexibility of the semiparametric technique also 
allows using large international samples of banks from different countries, without being 
concerned that certain banking markets in different countries or banks within the same 
country face or adopt different production technologies. Hence, this approach takes into 
account the heterogeneity in the production technology across banks, countries, and time. 
Delis (2012), Delis, Iosifidi and Tsionas (2012), and Wheelock and Wilson (2012) show that 
estimation of marginal cost using semiparametric and nonparametric methods produces 
significantly better results (in terms of lower bias) than parametric techniques and commonly 
used functional forms like the translog. 
The data used for the estimation of the Lerner index are from Bankscope and require 
an advanced cleaning process to avoid including duplicates in our sample. This literally 
involves examining each bank one by one and in many instances collecting information from 
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the banks’ websites, for example to examine the history of bank operation and ownership, the 
existence of subsidiaries with the same names with the parent bank, and the occurrence of 
M&As during our sample period. We provide all the details of this intensive data collection 
and processing in Appendix A. 
We also use two variants of the traditional Lerner index. The first is the efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index, which takes the form:  
. = ,itc itc itc itcitc
itc itc
TC MC Q
adj Lerner
TC
   

 
      (3) 
where Π is the banks’ profit and Q is the banks’ output, measured by the banks’ total earning 
assets. This index allows for the possibility that firms do not choose the prices and input levels 
in a profit-maximizing way. For the estimation of this index we use the exact same procedure 
as Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk (2012). 
The second variant of the Lerner index adopts a dual-output cost function. 
Specifically, many banks have a significant volume of off-balance sheet items that can be 
considered as a distinct output besides the total earning assets that are used as our main 
output. The off-balance sheet items are produced using essentially the same inputs with the 
single-output model of the bank and, thus, the single-output model may be missing some 
important information. For the estimated dual-output cost function and its derivative, see 
Appendix A. 
In Appendix B, we report the weighted mean values of the estimated Lerner index by 
country and year, with market shares as the weights. The equivalent estimates for the 
adjusted-Lerner index and the dual-output Lerner index are available on request. These 
values are effectively a new worldwide index of banking-sector competition, with larger 
coverage compared to existing literature. The weighted mean values are 0.27, 0.17, and 0.22 
for the Lerner index, the adjusted-Lerner index, and the Lerner index with two outputs, 
respectively. The Lerner index ranges between -0.12 in Ecuador in 1998 and 0.82 (close to 
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monopoly) in Cuba in 1997. The adjusted-Lerner index ranges between -0.18 in Paraguay in 
2002 and 0.82 in Cuba in 1997. We omit the discussion for the Lerner index for the two-
output case, as the results on this index are very similar to the other two Lerner indices. 
In Figure 1 we show the time trend in average bank competition for each of the three 
indices. In broad terms, all indices identify similar trends in competition for the 148 
economies over time. More precisely, average bank market power peaks in 2003-2004, 
declines in the period 2007-2008, and increases again in 2009 and 2010. This pattern may 
reflect the sharp increase in financial globalization before the financial crisis of 2007 and 
related reforms that are likely to have led to higher market power through cross-border 
M&A’s and increased efficiency, without an accompanying reduction in the lending rate. 
Evidently, the start of the global financial crisis coincides with a decrease in the market 
power. This may be related to capital losses and non-performing loans suffered by many 
banks, which reduced efficiency, or to the rising informational asymmetry costs faced by 
banks during crises (e.g., adverse selection and moral hazard) that sharply increase the real 
cost of lending. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
3.2. Foreign bank ownership 
Information for foreign bank ownership is from the database of Claessens and van Horen 
(2014). As we follow their approach in our own data processing to estimate bank market 
power, we have an almost identical sample of banks that we identify as foreign or domestic 
owned. Foreign-owned banks are identified as those with 50% or more of their assets owned 
by foreigners and we use this information to construct the foreign-owned dummy variable. 
This variable identifies the direct effect of foreign ownership on the market power of 
individual banks. 
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For the country-level foreign presence, Claessens and van Horen (2014) construct two 
indices. The first index is defined as the percentage of foreign banks among total banks in a 
country (foreign presence) and covers the period 1995 to 2009. The second is defined as the 
percentage of foreign bank assets among total bank assets (foreign presence in terms of 
assets). Even though the second index can be argued to describe foreign bank presence 
somewhat better, it is only available for the 2004-2009 period because of missing information 
on bank assets for a large number of banks before 2004. The correlation coefficient between 
the two indices for the period 2004-2009 is as high as 81.1%. Thus, the large time span of the 
data set makes the use of the first index optimal for our study, whereas the index based on the 
market share of foreign banks is used in a sensitivity analysis. 
By using foreign presence in the same equation with foreign-owned we are able to 
identify the separate impact of the two on banks’ market power. Figure 2 presents a scatter 
plot of the Lerner index against foreign presence and the associated regression line. The 
regression line has a positive slope that is statistically significant at the 1% level. It remains 
to be examined whether this relation continues to hold when controlling for foreign-owned 
and whether it can be interpreted as causal. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Based on the theoretical discussion of Section 2, we also hypothesize that the impact 
of foreign bank ownership on the market power of banks depends on differences in banking-
system transparency between the host and the origin country (Mian, 2006). To identify this 
potential heterogeneity we construct an additional variable. Specifically, financial-statement 
transparency in our context measures the degree to which banks face regulatory restrictions 
on their accounting disclosure. This index is constructed based on the following five 
questions: (1) whether the income statement includes accrued or unpaid interest or principal 
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on non-performing loans; (2) whether banks are required to produce consolidated financial 
statements, including non-bank financial affiliates or subsidiaries; (3) whether the off-balance 
sheet items are disclosed to the public; (4) whether banks’ directors are legally liable for 
misleading or erroneous information; and (5) whether the penalties have been enforced. The 
indicator potentially ranges from zero to five, where higher values indicate greater disclosure 
(i.e., more transparent financial statements).
1
 
For the construction of the distance variable we use a weighted distance measure 
between the host country and multiple foreign countries associated with the top five foreign 
banks in the host country.
2
 To be specific, we first calculate the distance between the host 
country and each of the foreign countries, and then compute the average weighted by the 
percentage of assets held by each foreign country. Let      denote the distance between 
country c and country f in terms of characteristic k and      denote the share of country c’s 
banking assets that are held by country f. The explanatory variable is constructed as: 
    ∑          ,         (4) 
where the summation is taken over the top five foreign banks. 
 
3.3. Control variables 
Consistent with previous studies, we include several control variables that are drawn from the 
literature on the determinants of bank competition to rule out other possible explanations for 
our results (e.g., Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; 
Delis, 2012). The bank-specific variables (indicated as Bitc in Equation (1)) include: the ratio 
                                                 
1
 We also experiment with other differences between the host and the foreign banking industries. Specifically, 
we measure differences in terms of: (i) restrictions on banks to own non-financial firms, (ii) entry barriers on 
banks, (iii) regulations in terms of the summation of the three previous regulatory characteristics, (iv) 
geographical distance between the capitals of the two countries, (v) institutions (information sharing, credit 
rights and property rights), (vi) culture, and (vii) banking-industry concentration. We include formal definitions 
for these variables in Table 1. However, the coefficients on the interaction terms of our foreign ownership 
variables with these distance variables are statistically insignificant. 
2
 Most of the host countries in our sample have fewer than five foreign banks operating in their respective 
markets. We keep a five bank upper limit in our estimations given that on average these top five foreign banks 
constitute over 99% of the foreign bank share in host countries. 
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of customer deposits to total assets (termed deposits) to control for the level of bank deposits 
supporting total assets; the ratio of equity capital to total assets (capitalization) to control for 
bank capitalization; the ratio of loans to total assets (loans) to control for bank specialization 
(also used as a crude measure of liquidity); and the natural logarithm of real total assets (bank 
size) to measure bank size. Delis (2012) shows that well-capitalized and larger banks are able 
to set higher margins or to have access to cheaper sources of funds due to scale economies 
and informational asymmetries. In contrast, a higher deposits ratio implies higher cost of 
intermediated funds and, thus, lower market power. In turn, loans is a measure of bank 
specialization, with a higher ratio relating to banks that focus on the traditional activity of 
credit provision. 
We additionally assess the robustness of our results to the use of other measures of 
bank liquidity (liquid assets divided by total assets) and credit risk (non-performing loans 
divided by total loans or loan loss provisions divided by total loans), but we did not find 
significant changes in our results. It should be noted that the sample is smaller when 
including the last two variables, due to missing data, and that the definition of liquid assets in 
Bankscope is sometimes different between countries. 
For the country-level characteristics we use a wide set of structural, regulatory, 
institutional, and macroeconomic variables. First, we use the entry restrictions index, which 
measures the degree to which all banks in a country face entry barriers. We construct this 
index using information from the studies of Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, Martinez Peria, and 
Mohseni-Cheraghlou (2012), Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008), and previous versions of the 
latter study (details are provided in Table 1). This index takes a value from zero to 12, with 
larger values denoting more stringent entry restrictions. 
We also use the relative share of privately owned banks vs. that of the publicly owned 
banks (constructed in terms of deposits). This allows avoiding to falsely attribute the impact 
of foreign bank ownership (which usually corresponds to private ownership), to the 
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associated impact of private ownership on banks’ market power. We note that poorer 
countries are associated with higher levels of public ownership of banks, which is consistent 
with the findings of La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). Further, we use the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is defined as the ratio of the sum of squared market 
shares of each bank in the industry. Market concentration measures, such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, have been considered in the past as measures of competition (Cetorelli and 
Strahan, 2006). There is now consensus that these indices are not accurate proxies of 
competition but they are nonetheless useful control variables as they reflect important 
industry characteristics (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Claessens and Laeven, 
2004). 
Another important set of characteristics that can potentially influence the relation 
between market power and foreign bank ownership relates to the regulatory framework in 
which banks operate (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Claessens and Laeven, 2004). 
We use three indices obtained from Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou (2012), Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008), and previous versions of the latter 
study. These indices represent activity restrictions, capital requirements, and supervisory 
power. Explicit definitions of these indices are provided in Table 1. For a literature review of 
the relation between bank competition and regulation, see for example Degryse and Ongena 
(2008). 
Moreover, we control for the impact of the macroeconomic environment common to 
all banks that can potentially affect competitive conditions. We use the share of the 
manufacturing sector relative to GDP (manufacturing) and the net inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) suggest that the manufacturing sector is 
highly bank-dependent and the conditions in this industry can affect the market power of 
banks through both demand and supply forces. Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez 
(2003) provide evidence suggesting that foreign banks follow their clients abroad. Thus, the 
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effect of foreign bank ownership on the banks’ market power might be overestimated when 
the net inflow of FDI and manufacturing are excluded from the analysis. 
In addition, we use information from the Heritage foundation on the size of the public 
sector, as measured by the ratio of government spending to GDP (government spending). 
Following the reasoning of La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), countries with a 
larger public sector are relatively inefficient, governments are interventionist, and protection 
of property rights is poor. Thus, we could observe a positive link between this measure of 
government size and banks’ market power. 
Along the same lines, we use the financial freedom index and the trade freedom index 
from the Heritage foundation. The financial freedom index measures independence from 
government control and interference in the financial sector. Higher values for this index 
reflect greater financial liberalization.
3
 The trade freedom index is a composite measure of 
the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and 
services, with higher values indicating more freedom to trade internationally. 
We also control for the prevailing political ideology and freedom using the ideology 
of chief executives variable (left, center, or right) from Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and 
Walsh (2001) (updated until 2012) and the polity variable from the Polity IV project, 
respectively. These two variables are potentially important in explaining the competitive 
conditions in the banking sector, because banks operating in more democratic and more 
rightwing countries will have fewer restrictions that might not be captured by our regulatory 
variables. Finally, we control for the level of economic development by including the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita, taken from the World Bank Indicators.
4
 
 
                                                 
3
 An alternative index has been constructed by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010) but its coverage ends in 
2005. 
4
 We exhaustively control with more than two hundred other variables taken from various databases. But we do 
not find any significant changes in the main results we report here. We therefore think our estimates are 
conservatively robust. 
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4. Foreign bank ownership and market power: Identification and results 
4.1. Empirical identification 
Two important identification problems are the dynamic nature of bank market power and the 
potential endogeneity of the foreign ownership variables. Concerning the former, Berger, 
Bonime, Covitz, and Hancock (2000) and Goddard, Molyneux, and Wilson (2004) suggest 
that even developed banking markets might be characterized by information opacity, 
networking, and relationship-lending, all of which impede competition. These elements cause 
persistence in the cost structure, profitability, and market power of banks. 
To account for these dynamics we include the first and/ or the second lag of the 
dependent variable among the regressors and use the GMM estimators for dynamic panels of 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). In our analysis we use the two-step 
“difference” GMM estimator with robust standard errors corrected using the method of 
Windmeijer (2005).
5
 The consistency of the GMM estimator depends both on the 
assumptions that the error term does not exhibit serial correlation and on the validity of the 
instruments. To this end, we use two tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to evaluate 
these assumptions. The first is the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the 
overall strength of the instruments. The second test examines the assumption of no serial 
correlation in the error terms. 
Note that the error term obtained from the estimation of equation (1) is likely to be 
serially correlated due to the fact that the dependent variable is observed at the bank-country-
year level and some of the explanatory variables are observed at the country-year level. This 
problem is comprehensively analyzed by Moulton (1990). Thus, estimation is carried out 
using standard errors clustered by country. We also experiment with country-specific year 
                                                 
5
 We prefer the “difference” over the “system” GMM estimator because the results on the specification tests are 
better under the former method. Specifically, we find that the lagged differences used as instruments under the 
system GMM procedure are rather poor instrumental variables. 
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effects, but this increases the number of instruments in the GMM procedure asymptotically 
and causes the Hansen test to be equal to unity. 
In estimating equation (1), endogeneity of the two foreign ownership variables can 
arise both from reverse causality and omitted variable bias. Reverse causality could emerge 
from the preference of foreign-owned banks to enter with monopolistic products with high 
markups, so as to generate higher profits. To alleviate these concerns of reverse causality, all 
the right-hand side variables except bank characteristics are lagged once. This is intuitive 
both statistically and theoretically. From a statistical viewpoint, the literature (e.g., Beck, 
Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013) suggests that explanatory variables in lags can potentially 
diminish endogeneity issues that emerge due to reverse causality. On the theoretical side, the 
banks are aware of their main balance-sheet characteristics when deciding on their cost 
structure and pricing policy (i.e., the components of the Lerner index). 
In turn, we reduce the omitted variable problem by using an IV-style instrumental 
variable. Specifically, we use the entry restrictions for foreign banks (ERFB) lagged once as 
an IV-style instrument. We construct this index with information from the studies of Cihak, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-Cheraghlou (2012), Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2008) and previous versions of the latter study (details are provided in Table 1). This index 
ranges between zero and four inclusive, with higher values reflecting higher entry restrictions 
for foreign banks. We identify the two endogenous variables by using both ERFBt-1 and 
ERFBt-2 as IV-style instruments. 
Naturally, the entry restrictions for foreign banks affect foreign bank ownership and 
presence in each country: we hypothesize that foreign bank presence must be lower in 
countries with significant protection of the domestic banking sector. Further, it seems 
unlikely that these restrictions affect banks’ market power directly. The only way that ERFB 
could be correlated with the Lerner indices is through common regulatory, institutional, and 
macroeconomic developments that tend to move together. However, as discussed in Section 
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3.3, in our empirical analysis we control for a number of such variables, and most importantly 
for the general entry restrictions common to all banks, foreign-owned or not. Thus, we 
distinguish between entry restrictions for foreign banks and general entry restrictions. We 
also control for year fixed effects, and other regulatory, macroeconomic, institutional, and 
political variables. Finally, we experiment with country*year fixed effects, the results being 
essentially the same.
6
 
Some of the control variables can also be considered as endogenous in equation (1) 
owing to omitted variable bias. Not treating them this way can bias the coefficient on the 
foreign ownership variable. GMM allows treating these variables as endogenous using lags of 
the instrumented variables as instruments (Bond, 2002; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 
2006; Roodman, 2009). We adopt this strategy despite its imperfections because finding 
instruments for all potential endogenous control variables is extremely difficult. We choose 
the lag-length of these instruments on the basis of the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions. 
In light of the above, the full set of the instrumental variables in the baseline 
specification includes the contemporaneous and the first lag of the entry restrictions for 
foreign banks as IV-style instruments, and, as GMM-style instruments, the third lag of the 
dependent variable, the first lags of the bank-specific control variables and the second to 
fourth lags of entry restrictions. In the specifications with additional controls we also add the 
second lags of these control variables as GMM-style instruments. Use of these instruments 
yields Hansen tests that do not reject the null of overidentifying restrictions. We are 
examining the sensitivity of our results with even fewer instruments to avoid the too-many 
instruments problem highlighted by Roodman (2009). Our results are essentially unchanged. 
                                                 
6
 We run additional tests for the validity of the ERFB variable as an instrument as follows. First, we regress, 
using the fixed effects model, the two foreign ownership variables on the ERFB variable plus controls and we 
find that ERFB is negative and strongly statistically significant. Also, we regress, again with the fixed effects 
model, the market power variables on the ERFB plus the same controls and we find that ERFB is statistically 
insignificant. 
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We also confirm, using the second-order autocorrelation test (reported as AR2), that our 
estimated equations do not suffer from serial correlation. 
 
4.2. Baseline results 
In Table 3 we report the results from the estimation of equation (1). The Hansen test shows 
that the estimated equations are not overidentified and the AR2 test that there is no second-
order autocorrelation. As expected, the values of the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable indicate that market power is quite persistent. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The specifications in Table 3 include the baseline models (columns I-III) and the 
models with structural, regulatory, macroeconomic, and institutional controls (columns IV-
IX). In the interest of parsimony, we do not include all these controls in the same equation. 
The coefficient of foreign-owned in column I shows that, controlling for bank characteristics, 
the average foreign bank in our sample does not have a significantly higher Lerner index 
compared to the average domestically owned bank. 
In Column II we repeat the same exercise, this time using only the foreign presence 
variable. The results show that the stronger presence of foreign banks increases the market 
power of the average bank. This effect is also economically significant. According to the 
baseline specification, a 10% increase in foreign presence will increase, on average, the 
Lerner index of banks by 0.09. Considering that the standard deviation of foreign presence is 
16.97 and the trend on this variable is increasing, it seems that the share of foreign banks is a 
very important explanatory factor of the bank-level markups. 
In Columns III-IX we carry out the same analysis this time including both foreign-
owned and foreign presence. The results show that the former variable remains statistically 
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insignificant, while the coefficients on foreign presence are essentially the same with those of 
column II. The implications of these results are then straightforward. The ownership status, 
foreign or domestic, of individual banks seems to play no role in explaining banks’ market 
power. Thus, we can rule out a significant direct effect of foreign-owned on bank market 
power, but we do find a positive and significant spillover effect of foreign presence on bank 
markups. Worth noting is that the positive association between foreign presence and market 
power remains prevalent after controlling for structural, regulatory, macroeconomic, and 
institutional factors in Table 3. 
The effect of the control variables is in line with expectations and with previous 
studies. For example, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) find that higher entry restrictions in 
banking markets are associated with a greater ability for the banks to charge a price above its 
marginal cost. In our sample we identify the same effect through the entry restrictions 
variable. We also find that well-capitalized banks are those possessing higher market power, 
which can be attributed to their ability to raise capital more easily and perhaps more 
inexpensively. In contrast, banks with higher deposits have lower market power in most of 
our specifications. This is consistent with the fact that the higher cost of deposits relative to 
other sources of bank funds, implies lower market power, probably because the marginal cost 
is higher. 
The impact of the structural variables in column IV is statistically insignificant. This 
result confirms that the structural variables, useful as they may be in revealing important 
structural characteristics of the industry, are not good proxies for bank competition 
(Claessens and Laeven, 2004). We find that more stringent capital requirements increase 
banks’ market power. This result has important policy implications in light of the discussions 
under the Basel accord surrounding the reforms in banking regulation.  
All the macroeconomic variables in column VI are statistically significant. In 
particular, the larger the manufacturing sector the lower is the Lerner index of banks, which 
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is intuitive because manufacturing firms can use more collateral compared to service and 
retail enterprises and, thus, obtain lower lending rates. In turn, a higher volume of foreign 
direct investment yields lower Lerner indices because these firms can obtain financing from 
their parent company or banks operating in their host countries and, thus, do not need to 
borrow from local banks. In turn, the positive effect of higher government spending on 
banks’ market power is consistent with La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), who 
suggest that large governments are interventionist and inefficient in protecting consumers and 
promote competitive market practices. 
In contrast, trade freedom enhances bank market power (column VII). This may be 
due to the increased demand for funding that was observed following the abrupt abolition of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers in the last two decades. With respect to the political variables 
(column VIII), we find that banks operating in more democratic and more right-wing 
countries have higher market power. One possible explanation for the effect of the latter 
variable is that competition policy is enforced less rigorously by right-wing governments; this 
is widely believed to be the case in the United States. Concerning the effect of democracy, we 
observe a considerable increase in the share of foreign bank presence over our sample period 
in many countries that are new democracies with no tradition in strong institutions and 
market-oriented policies. Yet, to reach a definite conclusion that the positive relationship 
between democratization and right-wing governments is not a spurious correlation, a much 
deeper analysis is required involving addressing the causality issue that is probably beyond 
the scope of the present study. This is more so if we consider that higher economic 
development (as measured by the GDP per capita) is associated with lower Lerner indices. 
In Table 4 we first assess the inclusion of foreign presence in terms of assets to 
examine the spillover effect (column I). The coefficient on this variable is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The economic significance is lower compared to 
foreign presence. This is expected because the assets-based variable incorporates the element 
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that foreign banks can also be partially owned by domestic owners, whereas foreign presence 
characterizes foreign banks entirely as foreign-owned or not. Still a 10% increase in foreign 
bank ownership in terms of assets will increase the Lerner index by 0.03. For the bank in our 
sample with an average Lerner index this implies an 13.6% increase in the Lerner index. 
Further, in column II we use as dependent variable the average Lerner by country and year (a 
country-level Lerner index), with the results being essentially the same with those of our 
baseline model (column III of Table 3). These results also hold with small variation even 
after using the adjusted-Lerner and the dual-output Lerner indices (columns III and IV of 
Table 4). 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The findings of Tables 3 and 4 are in contrast with the two existing studies on this 
issue (Claessens and Laeven; 2004; Jeon, Olivero, and Wu, 2011) that document a negative 
effect of foreign bank presence on market power measured at the country level. Intuitively, 
the increased foreign bank presence can increase the market power of banks for at least three 
reasons. First, foreign banks penetrate those banking sectors with profit opportunities. 
Usually the old regime of these sectors consists of banks with low-quality technology that 
miss-price risk. In these situations, foreign banks are better able to price risk through their 
technological advantage, and this leads to higher intermediation margins via higher 
intermediation prices. This effect is then carried over to the domestic banks, which will 
follow the new pricing schemes because they will, in time, gain access to the new technology.  
Second, foreign banks tend to lend to more creditworthy clients. From the demand 
side, these borrowers might be willing to pay higher margins, if they perceive foreign banks 
as less risky. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, foreign banks have the ability to offer 
new banking products compared to domestic banks. Thus, they become the monopolists in 
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these products, at least for some time. Below we will also show that the positive impact of 
foreign bank presence on banks’ market power is primarily driven by banks entering through 
M&As and will offer further intuition behind our main results. 
In Table 5 we further explore the nexus between foreign bank ownership and market 
power using alternative measures of market power (other than Lerner-type indices). In 
column I we use the H-statistic, which we estimate using the same PSLC method with our 
Lerner indices from the regression of bank interest revenues on the same three input prices 
(see also Table 1). By adding the observation-specific coefficients on the three input prices 
by bank and year, our method yields bank-year estimates for the H-statistic.
7
 The results 
provide a different picture than that of Tables 3 and 4. Specifically, the results show that 
foreign-owned (and not foreign presence) is the significant variable, the model predicting that 
foreign banks have a higher H-statistic (lower market power). Thus, the H-statistic is the only 
measure of market power among the ones commonly used in the literature, which predicts a 
positive and significant direct effect of foreign bank ownership on competition. However, as 
we highlight in Section 3.1, the H-statistic does not map the various levels of market power 
robustly and, thus, these results should be treated with caution. In contrast, the findings in 
columns II and III, where we use the World Bank’s Lerner and Boone indicators (observed at 
the country-year level), are consistent with our findings in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
 A potential problem with our estimates of the Lerner index is that changes in risk 
perceptions of banks could be unevenly reflected in prices and costs. The risk is of course 
also priced in deposit rates, which are part of our costs and are usually very easily adjustable 
                                                 
7
 The World Bank also has estimates for the H-statistic, however these are given for the cross-section of 
countries, limiting our study to a cross-sectional analysis with a small number of observations. The H-statistic 
has been estimated at the bank-level by Brissimis and Delis (2011). 
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within a given year, but there could still be some uneven distribution of risk to depositors and 
borrowers. To this end, we control in columns IV and V for two different measures of credit 
risk, namely the ratios of loan-loss provisions to total loans and non-performing loans to total 
loans, respectively.
8
 The first ratio is positive and significant, while the second is 
insignificant. However, in both cases the effect of foreign presence on Lerner remains 
essentially the same with that reported in Table 3. 
 The final exercise of Table 5 is about distinguishing between the numerator of the 
Lerner index (the margin between price and marginal cost) and the denominator (price). The 
results show that the effect of foreign presence on the Lerner index is due to the increase in 
the gap between the price and marginal cost (column VII). Thus, the main mechanism driving 
the increase in the market power of banks relates to the efficiency advantage of the foreign 
banks, which forces domestic banks to also become more efficient. However, this increase in 
efficiency is not accompanied by a reduction in the lending rates for the average bank. 
In additional robustness checks that we do not report owing to space considerations, 
we examine whether the relation between foreign bank ownership and bank market power is 
non-linear by adding the squared term of the two foreign bank ownership variables. We find a 
statistically insignificant coefficient on the squared term, while we still find that the level 
term of foreign presence is statistically and economically significant. We also experiment 
with many other bank-year and country-year control variables, the results being quantitatively 
similar. Finally, we add the second and the third lags of foreign-owned and foreign presence 
to allow more time for the effect of the foreign ownership variables to reach the market. 
Again, the coefficients on these lags are statistically insignificant. 
 
  
                                                 
8
 An alternative approach would be to control for risk in our estimations of marginal cost. However, we prefer to 
follow here the most recent literature in the definition of the cost function (e.g. Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk, 
2012). 
 28 
4.3. Heterogeneity in the results due to bank and country characteristics  
Up to now foreign presence seems to be the foreign ownership variable explaining bank 
market power. In this sub-section we use the theoretical conjectures of Section 2 to examine 
whether our main result on the spillover effect varies with specific bank- and industry-
specific characteristics. We carry out this analysis by adding in equation (1) interaction terms 
between foreign presence and these characteristics. The choice of the variables to be 
interacted with foreign presence is guided by the theoretical discussion of Section 2. We also 
examine the interaction terms between foreign-owned and the same characteristics, but the 
respective coefficients are statistically insignificant and, hence, we do not report them.
9
 
 Specifically, with respect to bank characteristics, we focus on the capitalization and 
deposits variables. In addition to the theoretical discussion in Section 2, we observe that in 
countries with higher than average foreign bank presence the mean capital ratios are 
significantly higher than in the countries with lower than average foreign bank presence 
(0.111 and 0.086, respectively). Similarly, the ratio of total customer deposits to total assets 
(deposits) is quite higher in countries with very low levels of foreign bank presence compared 
to countries with very high foreign bank presence. This is a crude indication that high foreign 
bank presence induces banks in the industry to hold significantly higher levels of capital, 
while they have significantly lower levels of loanable funds in the form of deposits. Then, 
this type of heterogeneity could have important implications for the relation between foreign 
bank presence and market power. 
To provide inference at the mean of the main effects, we mean-center the variables 
used to construct interaction terms. We report the estimation results from this exercise in the 
first two columns of Table 6. We find that the positive effect of foreign presence on bank 
market power is smaller for well-capitalized banks and larger for banks with high deposit 
                                                 
9
 One such interaction term of particular interest would be the one between Foreign-owned and foreign 
presence. This would allow to see whether the spillover effect is similar across the domestic and foreign banks. 
We find that this interaction term is statistically insignificant, showing that domestic and foreign banks are 
perfect substitutes in this process. 
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ratios, with the statistical significance of the interaction term including capitalization being 
higher. These findings suggest that if the banks in the host country are well-capitalized and 
have alternative sources of loanable funds, foreign banks will not have an advantage in 
lending and Lerner indices will be lower. Then, these characteristics of the host banking 
system are an important prerequisite for a neutral effect of foreign bank presence on market 
power. However, it should be noted that the levels of capitalization in which the impact of 
foreign bank presence turns negative is very high.
10
 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
In column III of Table 6 we present the results from a specification that includes an 
interaction term between the foreign bank ownership variable and the variable named country 
M&As. This variable equals the number of foreign owned banks that enter in the host country 
through an M&A over those that enter through the establishment of a new institution 
(greenfield entry), scaled from zero to one for expositional brevity. In our sample, two out of 
three foreign banks enter our sample through an M&A. The main effect of the demeaned 
foreign ownership variable comes out positive and statistically significant as before. The 
interaction effect is also positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that 
entry through M&As is one of the main causal factors of the positive relation between foreign 
presence and Lerner. Thus, greenfield entry of foreign banks, along with an equally 
capitalized domestic banking sector, seems to be the sine qua non to avoid the buildup of 
market power. 
In line with our arguments in Section 4.2 on the positive relation between foreign 
bank presence and market power, we can provide some further explanations of this important 
finding. First, a foreign bank usually brings in its own, many times superior, technology in 
                                                 
10
 Specifically, it would take a capitalization ratio equal to 0.42 for this to happen. 
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pricing risk and this can lead to a change in the pricing decisions compared to the acquired 
domestic-owned bank. To avoid losses associated with very risky borrowers of the old regime 
that get hegemonic loan deals, the foreign bank could charge higher rates instead of 
potentially dropping these strategic relationships. Indeed, foreign banks frequently enter a 
country via M&A's, instead of greenfield entry, to benefit from the comparative advantage in 
relationship lending of the existing domestic bank.  
Second, there is a very possible efficiency effect (Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 2005; 
Degryse, Havrylchyk, Jurzyk, and Kozak, 2012), which is also prevalent in the last two 
regressions of Table 5. Foreign banks mainly acquire domestic banks with high cost 
inefficiency and the new bank, after the M&A, tends to reduce marginal costs, which 
increases the Lerner index. On the same line, a recent strand of literature (Martinez Peria and 
Mody, 2004) suggests that cross-border M&As in banking are value destructing because of 
high inefficiency of the old domestic bank. The new bank entering through an M&A will 
lower costs, giving rise to higher Lerner indices. All in all, we have to keep in mind that there 
is a reason for the acquisition. Even in developed countries, the acquired bank usually is a 
low-performance institution or a government-owned one with no clear profit-maximizing 
objective.  
In column IV of Table 6 we examine whether our main result on the spillover effect 
varies with differences in financial-statement transparency. We observe that the estimated 
coefficient of foreign bank presence remains positive and significant and takes a value of 
0.010, which is the same with the baseline specification (column III of Table 3). The 
interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. However, the 
economic significance is quite high: for a large gap in the financial-statement transparency 
between the host and the origin country, the positive effect of foreign bank presence on 
Lerner becomes only 0.010-0.005=0.005 and is statistically insignificant. Intuitively, this 
implies that foreign banks from more advanced origin countries in terms of transparency and 
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market discipline bring in their progressive reporting techniques and reduce informational 
asymmetries in the banking sectors of the host countries. This, in turn, seems to benefit 
borrowers, given the lower levels of market power.
11
 
As a final exercise, we consider the potential heterogeneity in the coefficient on 
foreign presence based on the time (years) since the foreign bank presence reached a specific 
threshold. The rationale for including this variable is that the longer it takes foreign banks to 
dominate in a new market, the more acquainted they become with domestic practices and 
clientele, thereby facing lower informational and agency costs. To this end, we introduce 
interaction terms between the years since foreign presence reached a value of 40% and 50% 
and we present the estimation results in Table 7. We find a positive and marginally 
statistically significant (at the 10% level) interaction term in the first regression (foreign 
presence reached a value of 40%) and a higher statistical significance in the second 
regression. Therefore, our findings do seem to suggest that the longer a country has high 
levels of foreign bank presence, the higher the positive impact of foreign bank presence on 
banks’ market power. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the impact of foreign bank ownership on the market power of individual 
banks. We collect bank-year data for all countries in the world to estimate the market power 
of banks through the use of the Lerner index. We use a cost function with a semiparametric 
                                                 
11
 Existing studies find that the geographical distance between the host and the origin countries, as well as 
cultural, economic, and institutional differences could also matter for the foreign banks’ location decisions 
(Claessens and van Horen, 2014) and for their lending behavior in the host countries (Mian, 2006; Beck, 
Ioannidou, and Schafer, 2012). Thus, we also examine whether the impact of the foreign bank entry on the host 
country’s banks’ market power depends on such characteristics. Definitions for these distance variables are 
provided in Table 1. Yet, the interaction terms of all of these variables with foreign presence are statistically 
insignificant. We also experiment with interaction terms including banking-industry concentration, GDP per 
capita, and growth. Again these interaction terms are statistically insignificant. 
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technique that allows for a very flexible specification and does not impose a specific 
functional form on the data. Our method yields observation-specific estimates of the Lerner 
index for a maximum of 12,206 banks operating in 148 countries during the period 1997 to 
2010. 
Subsequently, we match our data set with that of Claessens and van Horen (2014) 
who have information on foreign bank ownership in 137 countries over the period 1995 to 
2009 (thus, our final sample is restricted to 131 countries over the period 1997-2009). Using 
the merged data sets we examine the impact of the ownership status (foreign or domestic) of 
individual banks on their market power (direct effect), as well as the impact of the share of 
the number of foreign-owned banks to the total number banks in the industry (spillover 
effect). 
We find that the only significant impact comes from the spillover effect and that this 
effect is positive in the sense of a higher bank market power due to an increased foreign bank 
presence. This effect seems to be transmitted through the considerably higher incidence of 
foreign bank entry through M&As, instead of greenfield entry, as well as through the 
capitalization of banks in the host country. We also find that the positive impact of the 
country-level trends in foreign bank presence on banks’ market power is significantly weaker 
when differences in the financial-statement transparency between the host and the origin 
country are rather important. 
These results have important policy implications for regulators and policy makers 
alike. If increased competition is the requirement, then it seems imperative that the host 
banking industry is well-capitalized and that foreign bank entry is made through greenfield 
entry. Further, a concomitant abolition of entry barriers and an establishment of strong 
transparency in the functioning of banks is warranted. If, in contrast, competition is already 
rather strong and there are concerns about the stability of the banking system, the foreign 
bank entry through M&As and the protectionist policies are preferable to increase the market 
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power of banks and their rents. Thus, a natural extension to our work would be to examine 
the real effects behind the positive nexus of foreign bank presence with banks’ market power. 
In particular, bank market power is usually linked to increased lending rates and, thus, to 
reduced welfare. Yet, a higher market power of banks increases bank profitability and can 
lead to increased financial stability. Given our findings, the special role of foreign bank 
presence in the bank market power-stability relation needs further examination. We leave this 
and other issues for future research. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and sources 
 
Name 
 
Description 
 
Data source 
 
Panel A: Variables used in the analysis of market power 
Earning assets Natural logarithm of deflated total earning assets (measure of a bank’s output). Bankscope 
Price of output Total income divided by total earning assets. Bankscope 
Expenses Natural logarithm of deflated total interest expenses and total noninterest expenses 
(measure of a bank’s total cost). 
Bankscope 
Price of deposits Natural logarithm of total interest expenses divided by total customer deposits. Bankscope 
Price of labor Natural logarithm of personnel expenses divided by total assets. Bankscope 
Price of physical capital  Natural logarithm of overheads minus personnel expenses divided by fixed assets. Bankscope 
 
Panel B: Variables used in the analysis of market power 
A. Dependent variable 
Lerner index The ability of an individual bank to charge a price above marginal cost. Own calculations 
Average Lerner index The Lerner index averaged by country and year Own calculations 
Adj.-Lerner index Variant of the Lerner index which allows for the possibility that firms do not choose 
the prices and input levels in a profit-maximizing way. 
Own calculations 
Dual-output Lerner Variant of the Lerner index that adopts a dual-output cost function. Own calculations 
H-statistic This is the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic measured by the elasticity of bank 
interest revenues to input prices. The H-statistic is estimated at the bank-year level 
using the same technique with the Lerner indices. Higher values reflect less market 
power. 
Own calculations 
Lerner World Bank The Lerner index by country and year, where marginal cost is estimated with the 
usual parametric techniques and a translog cost function.  
World Bank 
Boone World Bank The elasticity of profits to marginal costs by country and year, where marginal cost is 
estimated with the usual parametric techniques and a translog cost function. 
World Bank 
B. Bank characteristics 
Deposits Total customer deposits divided by total assets. Bankscope 
Capitalization Equity capital divided by total assets. Bankscope 
Loans Total loans divided by total assets. Bankscope 
Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets. Bankscope 
C. Main explanatory variables 
Foreign-owned Dummy variable equal to one if bank is foreign owned (50% or more of their assets) Claessens and Van Horen (2014) 
Foreign presence The ratio of the number of foreign banks over the number of all banks. Claessens and Van Horen (2014) 
Foreign presence in terms of 
assets  
The ratio of the assets of foreign banks over the total assets of all banks. Claessens and Van Horen (2014) 
Country M&As The ratio of the number of foreign-owned banks that enter via M&As over the 
number of all banks (scaled from zero to one). 
Claessens and Van Horen (2014) 
Entry restrictions The index measures the degree to which banks face entry restrictions in the banking 
market and is constructed by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each 
one of the following twelve questions: (1) Is more than one license required (e.g. one 
for each banking activity)? (2) Which of the following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the banking license: (a) draft bylaws (b) intended 
organizational chart (c) financial projections for first three years (d) financial 
information on main potential shareholders (e) background/experience of future board 
directors (f) background/experience of future senior managers (g) source of funds to 
be used as capital. (3) What were the primary reasons for denial of the applications: 
(a) capital amount or quality (b) banking skills (c) reputation (d) other? This index 
takes a value from 0 to 12, with larger values denoting more stringent entry 
restrictions. 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou (2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001) 
Loan-loss provisions Loan-loss provisions divided by total loans  Bankscope 
Non-performing loans Non-performing loans Bankscope 
Private ownership The percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned banks were used to construct 
rating intervals. Countries with larger shares of privately held deposits received 
higher ratings. 
Economic freedom of the world: 
2012 Annual report 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index of each bank's total earning assets (takes value from 0 to 
1). 
Own calculations 
Activity restrictions The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the level of regulatory 
restrictions on bank participation in: (1) securities activities, (2) insurance activities, 
(3) real estate activities, and (4) bank ownership of non-financial firms. These 
activities can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohibited and on this basis the 
variable is assigned the values of 1, 2, 3 or 4, respectively. The index takes a value 
from 0 to 16, with larger values denoting more stringent activity restrictions. 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001) 
Capital requirements  This variable is determined: (a) by adding 2, 1, or 0 if the answer is Basel II, Basel I, 
or other; in the question: Which is the regulatory capital adequacy regime?, (b) by 
adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise in the questions: Does the ratio vary 
with market risk? Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
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regulatory/supervisory authorities?, (c) by adding 1 if the answer is no and 0 
otherwise in the questions: Can the initial or subsequent injections of capital be done 
with assets other than cash or government securities? Can initial disbursement of 
capital be done with borrowed funds? This index takes a value from 0 to 6, with 
larger values denoting more stringent capital requirements.  
(2008,2004,2001) 
Supervisory power  Index of the powers of the supervisor of the banking sector, reflecting whether the 
supervisory agency has the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct 
problems in the banking sector. Takes values from 0 to 14, with higher values 
reflecting more supervisory powers (see Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2008). 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001) 
Manufacturing The sum of gross output minus the value of intermediate inputs used in the production 
of manufacturing goods. 
World Development Indicators 
Foreign direct investment The net inflow of foreign direct investment. World Development Indicators 
Government spending  The level of government expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Heritage Foundation 
Financial freedom Index of banking security and independence from government control. Larger values 
indicate more freedom. 
Heritage Foundation 
Trade freedom A composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect 
imports and exports of goods and services. Larger values indicate more freedom. 
Heritage Foundation 
Ideology The classification rule for the chief executive of each country is as follows: Right (1); 
Center (2); Left (3); No information (NA); No executive (NA). 
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, 
and Walsh (2001) 
Polity The polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Polity IV 
GDP per capita Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. World Development Indicators 
Difference in transparency The weighted difference in the banks’ financial-statement transparency between the 
host and the origin country. 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001), Bankscope 
and own calculations 
Years of foreign 
ownership>40% 
The number of consecutive years since when the foreign ownership variable reached 
a value of 40% or higher in a specific country (zero otherwise). 
Own calculations 
Years of foreign 
ownership>50% 
The number of consecutive years since when the foreign ownership variable reached 
a value of 50% or higher in a specific country (zero otherwise). 
Own calculations 
D. Instrumental variable   
Entry restriction for foreign 
banks 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each 
one of the following four questions: Are foreign entities prohibited from entering 
through: (1) Acquisition, (2) Subsidiary, (3) Branch and (4) Joint venture. The index 
takes a value from 0 to 4, with larger values denoting more stringent entry restrictions 
for foreign banks. 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001) 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
The table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
Variable Level Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Variables used in the derivation of market power from 1997-2010 
Earning assets Bank 89,778 11.71 2.02 6.83 21.38 
Price of output Bank 89,778 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.71 
Expenses Bank 89,778 8.85 1.93 4.55 18.41 
Price of deposits Bank 89,778 0.06 0.09 0 1.03 
Price of labor Bank 89,778 0.02 0.01 0 0.09 
Price of physical capital Bank 89,778 1.70 3.71 0.13 56.96 
Marginal cost Bank 89,019 0.07 0.06 0.006 1.656 
Panel B: Variables used in the analysis of market power from 1997-2009 
Lerner index Bank 80,725 0.22 0.12 -0.2 0.95 
Adjusted-Lerner index Bank 78,724 0.17 0.12 -0.2 0.95 
Dual-output Lerner index Bank 74,366 0.21 0.20 -11.54 0.95 
H-statistic Bank 82,151 0.23 0.23 -0.56 0.46 
Lerner World Bank Country 81,943 0.21 0.08 -1.61 0.82 
Boone World Bank Country 74,111 -0.05 0.10 -2.08 5.69 
Deposits Bank 82,151 0.69 0.2 0 1.93 
Capitalization Bank 82,146 0.1 0.08 -2.58 1 
Loans Bank 82,083 0.61 0.19 0 9.36 
Bank size Bank 82,151 12.85 1.66 7.7 21.51 
Loan-loss provisions Bank 45,948 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.26 
Non-performing loans Bank 79,690 0.02 0.70 -5.70 180.54 
Foreign-owned Bank 82,151 0.07 0.27 0 1 
Country M&As Country 82,151 0.72 0.32 0 1 
Foreign presence Country 82,151 20.6 16.97 0 100 
Foreign presence in terms of assets Country 42,490 18.39 18.54 0 100 
Entry restrictions Country 81,423 7.56 1.96 0 12 
Private ownership Country 72,775 7.65 2.46 0 10 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index Country 82,151 0.09 0.14 0 1 
Activity restrictions Country 81,454 9.01 2.51 1 16 
Capital requirements Country 81,593 3.53 0.86 0 6 
Supervisory power Country 81,543 11.05 2.27 1 14 
Manufacturing Country 80,575 17.93 4.55 1.82 35.63 
Foreign direct investment Country 81,980 5.62 34.22 -15.03 564.92 
Government spending Country 81,894 50.89 21.04 0 99.3 
Financial freedom Country 81,894 64.13 18.58 10 90 
Trade freedom Country 81,894 77.72 9.97 0 95 
Ideology Country 78,136 1.64 1.08 0 3 
Polity Country 80,559 8.88 3.19 -10 10 
GDP per capita Country 82,109 10.09 0.82 6.1 11.21 
Difference in transparency Country 79,571 -0.44 0.64 -4.1 1.94 
Years of foreign ownership>40% Country 82,151 0.59 2.13 0 13 
Years of foreign ownership>50% Country 82,151 0.39 1.7 0 13 
Entry restrictions for foreign banks Country 81,987 0.09 0.34 0 4 
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Table 3. The impact of bank foreign bank ownership and foreign bank presence on market power 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable in columns I-IX is the Lerner index. The variables are defined in Table 1. 
All regressions are estimated with the two-step “difference” GMM estimator for dynamic panels and robust standard errors are clustered by country. Also, all 
regressions include year-fixed effects. Wald is the p-value of the Wald test, which shows the joint statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. Hansen is 
the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept the null (valid instruments) at the 5% level. AR1 
and AR2 are the p-values of the tests for the first- and- second-order autocorrelation, respectively. All equations include GMM-style instruments (lags) and the 
entry restriction for foreign banks (ERFBt-1) as an IV-style instrument. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
 Bank 
ownership 
Country 
ownership 
Spillover 
effect 
Structural 
variables 
Regulation 
variables 
Macroeconomic 
variables 
Freedom 
variables 
Political 
variables 
GDP per 
capita 
Lagged dependent 0.626*** 0.413*** 0.412*** 0.335*** 0.451*** 0.465*** 0.412*** 0.372*** 0.468*** 
 (3.903) (3.328) (3.375) (2.699) (3.981) (3.709) (2.601) (2.889) (3.482)    
Deposits -0.208 -0.369* -0.332* -0.346 -0.315* -0.146 -0.230* -0.301** -0.241    
 (-1.272) (-1.932) (-1.871) (-1.388) (-1.923) (-0.881) (-1.807) (-2.040) (-1.335)    
Capitalization 0.597** 0.838*** 0.841*** 0.766*** 0.639*** 0.693*** 0.746*** 0.723*** 0.906*** 
 (2.548) (4.247) (4.303) (3.228) (3.146) (3.567) (3.749) (2.950) (4.021)    
Loans 0.039 -0.092 -0.071 -0.055 -0.073 -0.045 -0.026 -0.017 0.050    
 (0.540) (-0.687) (-0.542) (-0.400) (-0.696) (-0.532) (-0.252) (-0.215) (0.267)    
Bank size 0.031** 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.006 -0.011 0.002 0.000 0.044    
 (2.143) (0.364) (0.423) (0.014) (0.291) (-0.595) (0.081) (0.027) (1.336)    
Foreign-owned -0.307 
 
-0.192 -0.192 -0.218 -0.342* -0.290 -0.066 -0.186    
 (-1.029) 
 
(-0.804) (-0.569) (-1.033) (-1.648) (-1.447) (-0.361) (-0.755)    
Foreign presence 
 
0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 
 
 
(3.158) (3.004) (3.439) (3.026) (2.230) (2.931) (3.774) (2.870)    
Entry restrictions 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (6.304) (5.065) (4.947) (4.171) (5.589) (4.846) (5.035) (6.395) (5.953)    
Private ownership    -0.001      
    (-0.208)      
HHI    -0.075      
    (-1.127)      
Activity restrictions     0.003     
     (0.814)     
Capital requirements     0.020***     
     (2.708)     
Supervisory power     0.004     
     (1.008)     
Manufacturing      -0.010***    
      (-4.134)    
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FDI      -0.000***    
      (-4.216)    
Government spending      0.001**    
      (2.353)    
Financial freedom       0.000   
       (0.485)   
Trade freedom       0.004***   
       (3.757)   
Ideology        -0.005**  
        (-2.206)  
Polity        0.021**  
        (2.110)  
GDP per capita         -0.334**  
         (-2.297)    
Observations 49,948 49,948 49,948 46,782 49,887 49,052 49,871 46,756 49,944 
Wald 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen 0.336 0.288 0.288 0.770 0.852 0.640 0.402 0.795 0.241 
AR1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.001 
AR2 0.478 0.796 0.747 0.550 0.983 0.832 0.557 0.657 0.985 
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Table 4. Sensitivity to different Lerner indices and measures of foreign bank presence 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable in column I is the Lerner index, 
in II the average Lerner index by country and year, in III the adjusted-Lerner index, and in IV the Lerner index 
obtained from the dual-output cost function. The variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated with 
the two-step “difference” GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors clustered by country. Also, all 
regressions include year-fixed effects. Wald is the p-value of the Wald test, which shows the joint statistical 
significance of the coefficient estimates. Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, 
which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept the null (valid instruments) at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p-
values of the tests for the first- and- second-order autocorrelation, respectively. All equations include GMM-style 
instruments (lags) and the entry restriction for foreign banks (ERFBt-1) as an IV-style instrument. The *, **, *** 
marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
I II III IV 
Dependent variable: Lerner Average Lerner Adj.-Lerner Dual-output Lerner 
Lagged dependent 0.361* 0.434*** 0.572*** 0.265*** 
 (1.835) (3.646) (5.906) (3.871)    
Deposits -0.356 -0.329*** -0.355** -0.103    
 (-1.348) (-2.653) (-2.566) (-0.361)    
Capitalization 0.910* -0.096 0.922*** 0.819**  
 (1.843) (-0.796) (3.975) (2.442)    
Loans 0.076 -0.184** -0.078 0.074    
 (0.584) (-2.539) (-0.430) (0.501)    
Bank size 0.026 -0.021 0.009 0.037    
 (0.999) (-0.892) (0.456) (1.540)    
Foreign-owned -0.004 0.089 -0.022 -0.032    
 (-0.017) (0.446) (-0.113) (-0.211)    
Foreign presence in terms of assets  0.003***  
 
               
(3.824)  
 
               
Foreign presence 
 
0.009*** 0.006** 0.004*   
 
 
(3.230) (2.108) (1.785)    
Entry restrictions 0.040 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 
 (1.440) (2.587) (3.942) (2.767)    
Bank observations 25,902 51,387 47,191 56,046 
Wald 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen 0.190 0.895 0.291 0.379 
AR1 0.048 0.001 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.617 0.078 0.509 0.365 
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Table 5. Other measures of market power, controlling for bank risk, and decomposition of the Lerner index 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable in columns I is the H-statistic, in II 
the Lerner index of the World Bank by country and year, in III the Boone indicator from the World Bank, in IV and V our 
usual Lerner index, in VI the different between price (P) and marginal cost (MC) and in VII MC. The variables are defined 
in Table 1. All regressions are estimated with the two-step “difference” GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard 
errors clustered by country. Also, all regressions include year-fixed effects. Wald is the p-value of the Wald test, which 
shows the joint statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept the null (valid instruments) at the 5% level. 
AR1 and AR2 are the p-values of the tests for the first- and- second-order autocorrelation, respectively. All equations 
include GMM-style instruments (lags) and the entry restriction for foreign banks (ERFBt-1) as an IV-style instrument. The *, 
**, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Dependent variable: H-statistic 
Lerner 
World Bank 
Boone 
World Bank Lerner Lerner P P-MC 
Lagged dependent 0.373*** -0.339 0.314*** 0.094 0.372*** 0.418*** 0.439*** 
 
(6.585) (-1.414) (4.634) (1.229) (2.926) (4.028) (6.994)    
Deposits 0.234* -0.291** -0.030 -0.235* -0.204 0.190 -0.045    
 (1.867) (-2.471) (-0.297) (-1.784) (-1.594) (1.366) (-1.601)    
Capitalization 0.242* 0.194 -0.002 0.595*** 0.518*** 0.238 0.230*** 
 (1.892) (0.561) (-0.025) (2.628) (2.952) (1.504) (7.183)    
Loans -0.176* 0.136 -0.186 0.056 0.068 0.037 -0.026    
 (-1.787) (0.362) (-1.536) (0.324) (0.747) (0.475) (-1.158)    
Bank size -0.044 -0.024 -0.038** 0.019 0.004 0.007 0.003    
 (-1.354) (-0.493) (-2.159) (1.106) (0.171) (0.188) (0.922)    
Foreign-owned 0.660** -0.246 0.228 -0.186 -0.503 0.081 0.003    
 (2.230) (-0.487) (1.166) (-0.678) (-1.261) (0.366) (0.105)    
Foreign presence 0.001 0.015*** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.009*** -0.002 0.001**  
 (0.168) (3.654) (2.148) (3.309) (2.685) (-0.426) (2.085)    
Entry restrictions -0.003 0.027*** -0.001 0.014*** 0.014*** -0.004 0.000    
 (-0.777) (2.926) (-0.191) (4.291) (3.096) (-1.337) (0.634)    
Loan-loss provisions 
   
0.005*** 
  
               
    
(3.259) 
  
               
Non-performing loans 
    
-0.286 
 
               
     
(-0.224) 
 
               
Observations 51,388 61,898 55,788 48,404 28,818 51,388 51,388 
Wald 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen 0.735 0.624 0.562 0.760 0.991 0.268 0.607 
AR1 0.000 0.253 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.278 0.860 0.509 0.101 0.428 0.418 0.458 
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Table 6. Foreign bank presence and market power: Heterogeneous effects 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable is the Lerner index. The variables are 
defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated with the two-step “difference” GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard 
errors clustered by country. Also, all regressions include year-fixed effects. Wald is the p-value of the Wald test, which shows 
the joint statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept the null (valid instruments) at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are 
the p-values of the tests for the first- and- second-order autocorrelation, respectively. All equations include GMM-style 
instruments (lags) and the entry restriction for foreign banks (ERFBt-1) as an IV-style instrument. The *, **, *** marks denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
I II III IV 
Heterogeneous effects due to: 
 
Capitalization Deposits Entry through 
M&As 
Difference in  
transparency 
Lagged dependent 0.502*** 0.509*** 0.437*** 0.430*** 
 (3.400) (3.804) (4.255) (3.467)    
Deposits -0.433* -0.459** -0.382** -0.323    
 (-1.932) (-2.399) (-2.036) (-1.627)    
Capitalization 0.713*** 0.758*** 0.884*** 0.885*** 
 (2.753) (3.262) (2.996) (3.866)    
Loans 0.012 0.003 -0.002 0.063    
 (0.099) (0.023) (-0.016) (0.545)    
Bank size 0.041 0.072* 0.057* 0.058**  
 (1.511) (1.930) (1.938) (2.009)    
Foreign-owned -0.616 -0.592 -0.765 -0.506    
 (-1.498) (-1.235) (-1.612) (-1.249)    
Foreign presence 0.011** 0.007** 0.008** 0.010**  
 (2.439) (2.079) (2.116) (2.400)    
Entry restrictions 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 
 (3.591) (2.941) (3.573) (3.918)    
Foreign presence * Capitalization -0.026**  
 
               
 (-2.118)  
 
               
Foreign presence * Deposits 
 
0.012* 
 
               
 
 
(1.659) 
 
               
Country M&As 
 
 0.026                
 
 
 (0.431)                
Foreign presence * Country M&As 
 
 0.008**                
 
 
 (2.090)                
Foreign presence *  
Difference in transparency  
 
 
-0.005*   
 
 
 
(-1.676)    
Bank observations 49,948 49,948 49,948 48,679 
Wald 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen 0.287 0.517 0.219 0.557 
AR1 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 
AR2 0.944 0.883 0.285 0.713 
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Table 7. Foreign bank presence and market power: Heterogeneous effects due to the number of years 
since foreign bank presence reaches a specific threshold 
This table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable is the Lerner index. The 
variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated with the two-step “difference” GMM for dynamic 
panels and robust standard errors clustered by country. Also, all regressions include year-fixed effects. Wald is 
the p-value of the Wald test, which shows the joint statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. Hansen is 
the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept 
the null (valid instruments) at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p-values of the tests for the first- and- second-
order autocorrelation, respectively. All equations include GMM-style instruments (lags) and the entry restriction 
for foreign banks (ERFBt-1) as an IV-style instrument. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  I II 
 Heterogeneous effects due to:  
 
Years of foreign ownership>40% Years of foreign ownership>50% 
Lagged dependent 0.440*** 0.434*** 
 (3.922) (3.695)    
Deposits -0.322** -0.346**  
 (-2.027) (-2.150)    
Capitalization 0.667** 0.873*** 
 (2.547) (4.364)    
Loans -0.003 -0.003    
 (-0.025) (-0.026)    
Bank size 0.029 0.032*   
 (1.387) (1.789)    
Foreign-owned -0.198 -0.069    
 (-0.851) (-0.764)    
Foreign presence 0.005*** 0.008*** 
 (2.661) (3.330)    
Entry restrictions 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 (6.550) (5.703)    
Years of foreign ownership -0.034* -0.063**  
 (-1.742) (-2.150)    
Foreign presence * Years of foreign 
ownership 
0.001* 0.001**  
(1.799) (2.193)    
Observations 49,905 49,905 
Wald 0.000 0.000 
Hansen 0.849 0.889 
AR1 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.835 0.813 
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Appendix A. Estimation of the Lerner indices 
Consider a cost equation of the general form: 
, , ,( , , , )itc itc L itc K itc D itcTC f Q W W W ,                 (A.1) 
where WL,itc, WK,itc and WD,itc are factor prices of labor, capital and deposits and Qitc is the 
output of each bank i at time t in country c. Because we will be using a semiparametric 
approach to estimate the cost function, the choice of the functional form is not of primary 
significance; hence we aim for simplicity and use a standard log-linear production function. 
Also, we impose the usual linear homogeneity restriction in input prices, that is we normalize 
total cost and the input prices by the price of deposits before taking logs. We end up with the 
following cost function:  
1 2 , 3 , 1ln ln ln ln .itc L itc K itc itcTC b b W b W a Q                 (A.2) 
The PLSC model uses the local polynomial fitting regression and the Gaussian kernel 
function. A thorough theoretical discussion of the PLSC model can be found in Fan and 
Zhang (1999) and Mamuneas, Savvides, and Stengos (2006). Here we only provide a brief 
outline of the econometrics of our method. 
Specifically, and by dropping the t and c subscripts for simplicity, we can write the 
total cost equation in econometric form as follows: 
   1 2| .i i i i i i i iY Y W e X V Z e                     (A.3) 
In this equation, β2 is a function of one or more variables with dimension k added to the 
vector Z, which is an important element of the analysis and will be discussed below. The 
linear part in (A.3) is in line with the idea of the semiparametric model as opposed to a 
nonparametric model (e.g., Zhang, Lee, and Song, 2002). The coefficients of the linear part 
are estimated in the first step as averages of the polynomial fitting by using an initial 
bandwidth chosen by cross-validation (Hoover, Rice, and Wu, 1998). We then average these 
estimates β1i and β2i to receive β1 and β2 in (A.3). In the second step we use the average 
estimates and (A.3) to redefine the dependent variable as follows: 
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 * *2ˆi i i i i iY Y X V z e      ,               (A.4) 
where the asterisks denote the redefined dependent variable and error term. β2(z) is a vector 
of smooth but unknown functions of zi, estimated using a local least squares approach of the 
form 
1
1 2 1 * 1
2
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Equation (A.5) represents a local constant estimator, where K(z, λ) is a kernel function, λ is 
the smoothing parameter (chosen by generalized cross validation) for sample size n, and k is 
the dimension of zi.  
If we assume that z is a scalar and K is a uniform kernel, then (A.5) can be written as 
follows: 
1
2 *
2
| | | |
ˆ ( )
j j
j j j
z z z z
z V V Y
 


   
   
    
      
  .               (A.6) 
In (A.6), 
2
ˆ ( )z is a least squares estimator obtained by regressing *jY on jV , using the 
observations of ( jV , 
*
jY ) for which the corresponding zj is close to z, that is, | |jz z   . 
Therefore, to estimate 
2
ˆ ( )z , we only use observations within this “sliding window.” Note 
that no assumptions are made about this estimator globally, but locally—within the sliding 
window—we assume that 
2
ˆ ( )z  can be well-approximated. Also, because       is a smooth 
function of z,    (  )         is small when | |jz z  is small. The condition that nλ is large 
ensures that we have sufficient observations within the interval | |jz z    when 2 ( )jz  is 
close to 2 ( )z . Therefore, under the conditions 0   and 
kn   (for k≥1), the local 
least squares regression of *
jY on jV  provides a consistent estimate of 2 ( )z  (for a proof, see 
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Li, Huang, Li, and Fu, 2002). Therefore, the estimation method is usually referred to as a 
local regression. 
We can now re-write (A.2) in econometric form as: 
1 1 2, , 3, ,ln ( ) ln ln lnitc itc itc itc L itc itc K itc itcTC b a z Q b W b W e     ,            (A.7) 
where e is a stochastic disturbance and z is the smoothing variable. The choice of the 
variable(s) to comprise z is a critical issue in the estimation process. The best candidates are 
variables that are highly correlated with a1 and exhibit substantial variation across banks, 
countries and time. In a cost function, the natural candidates to use are the input prices. The 
advantage of this choice is that input prices most certainly affect a1 to a large extent. This has 
been shown many times in estimates of parametric translog cost functions that include 
multiplicative terms of output with input prices. Delis, Iosifidi, and Tsionas (2012) also 
propose using as z the linear combination of input prices, when using the PLSC model. 
Following this paradigm, we define the smoothing variable as zitc = lnWL,itc + lnWK,itc. We 
find that our results are not sensitive to the use of other z functions, such as the product of the 
input prices or linear combinations with different weights. From (A.7) we can obtain the 
marginal cost at the bank-year level as   1/ /itc itc itc itc itcTC Q a z TC Q   . We then use the 
estimates of marginal cost and equation (2) to calculate the Lerner index. 
To estimate equation (A.7) and compute the Lerner index we rely on Bankscope as 
our primary source of bank-level data. We focus on commercial banks, savings banks and 
cooperative banks. We exclude real-estate and mortgage banks, investment banks, other non-
banking credit institutions (mainly operating in Germany), specialized governmental credit 
institutions, bank-holding and other holding companies.
12 
Besides bank-holding companies, 
the excluded institutions are less dependent on the traditional intermediation function and 
have a different financing structure compared to our focus group. In turn, the inclusion of 
bank-holding companies can lead to double counting, as these are corporations controlling 
                                                 
12
 The main activities of the excluded financial institutions relate to the following: provide mortgages; assist 
corporations and governments in a range of services (e.g., M&A’s, raising capital, etc.); provide credit to public 
sectors; provide funding for public or municipal projects.  
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one or more banks. We checked one by one all banks to confirm that we have the subsidiaries 
of these companies in the sample to avoid false exclusion. 
We apply three further selection rules to avoid including duplicates in our sample. 
This is an essential part of the sample-selection process and is absent in most empirical 
studies using the Bankscope database (for a similar strategy with ours, see Claessens and van 
Horen, 2014). First, even though we do not include bank-holding companies, we still need to 
exclude double entries between parent banks and subsidiaries. Bankscope’s consolidation 
code system allows downloading either consolidated or unconsolidated statements, but in 
some cases information on either unconsolidated or consolidated statements of certain banks 
is not available.
13 
We use either the consolidated or the unconsolidated statement depending 
on which one is available. This is a non-trivial choice and requires the re-examination of all 
banks on an individual basis to avoid double counting. Notably, there are cases of banks with 
subsidiaries in domestic or in foreign countries and one should be very careful in avoiding 
double-counting of subsidiaries that are established, for example, in a foreign country.
14
 
Second, we account for mergers and acquisitions (M&A’s). We went through all the 
M&A’s one by one and made sure that both banks appear separately in the sample before the 
M&A and only the merged entity or the acquiring bank is included in the sample after the 
event. For example, if bank A and bank B merged in 2005, we create a new entity AB after 
2005 and exclude the separate financial accounts of A and B that might still be reported for 
some time after the merger. We identify M&A’s and their timing using Bankscope and the 
websites of the merging parties. 
                                                 
13
 A consolidated statement is the statement of a bank integrating the statements of its subsidiaries or branches. 
An unconsolidated statement does not integrate subsidiaries. 
14
 Let us provide some examples to clarify this point. Assume that bank A1 is the parent bank with a 
consolidated (C) statement and banks A11, A12 and A13 are subsidiaries with unconsolidated (U) statement. If 
we include all banks in our sample we will have 3 duplicates. Hence, we need to subtract either the percentage 
of the subsidiaries or to exclude the subsidiaries from the sample. The former solution is not feasible because 
we do not have enough information for the percentage and the time duration of the ownership of the 
subsidiaries. Thus, we resort to the later solution. Two other examples for the case of banks with foreign 
subsidiaries that we account for using the same strategy are (i) B1 is a parent bank with a C statement, B11 is a 
subsidiary bank operating in the domestic market with a C or a U statement and B111 is a sub-subsidiary bank 
operating in the domestic market and (ii) B1 is a parent bank with C statement, B12 is a subsidiary bank 
operating abroad with a C or a U statement and B121 is a sub-subsidiary bank operating in the domestic market 
with a U statement.  
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Third, in the US there are quite a few separate banks that have the same name but are 
active in a different state. To solve this issue, we relate the value of total assets of, say, bank i 
in the last year this bank appears in our sample with Bankscope’s identification number for 
bank i. This also allows avoiding problems with our procedure concerning M&A’s described 
above. 
As a final step, we clean our sample from negative values of total assets and total 
expenses. Additionally, we drop 1%  of our sample from each end of the distribution of each 
of the three input prices. This excludes unreasonably high or low input prices (Delis, 2012; 
Claessens and Laeven, 2004). Notably, the initial dataset before all the steps of the cleaning 
process includes 300,180 observations for 21,445 banks operating in 149 countries between 
1997 and 2010. Our final dataset for the estimation of market power consists of 89,778 
observations for 12,206 banks operating in 148 countries between 1997 and 2010. Most of 
the observations dropped are related to some form of double-counting stemming from 
Bankscope’s consolidation system and M&As. This highlights the importance of the data-
cleaning process in generating sensible indices of bank competition. 
In Panel A of Table 1 we define the variables used to estimate the cost function and 
then calculate the Lerner index, and in Panel A of Table 2 we provide summary statistics for 
these variables. To measure bank inputs and outputs we use the intermediation approach, 
which assumes that deposits are inputs used in the production process to produce bank 
outputs. A number of studies have shown this approach to be the preferred one (e.g., Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997; Hughes and Mester, 1993). In particular, we measure bank total costs 
(TC) by real total expenses, and bank output (Q) by real total earning assets. This measure for 
bank output relates to the traditional banking activities and, therefore, our main indices 
reflect competition in these activities. We construct real variables using the GDP deflator 
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(obtained from the World Bank).
15 
Real total earning assets include loans, securities, and 
other earning assets (such as investments and insurance assets). 
In turn, the three input prices are: WL for the price of labor, which is measured by the 
ratio of personnel expenses to total assets;
16 
WK for the price of physical capital, measured by 
the ratio of capital expenditures to fixed assets; and WD for the price of deposits, which is 
measured as total interest expenses over total customer deposits. For the Lerner index we 
also need a proxy for the output price (P), which is calculated as the ratio of total income 
over total earning assets (e.g., Beck, Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013). 
Finally, to estimate the dual-output Lerner index we use the following cost function: 
1 1 1, 2 2, 2, , 3, ,ln ( ) ln ln ln lnitc itc itc itc itc L itc itc K itc itcTC b a z Q a Q b W b W e      ,           (A.8)  
where Q1 equals Q in the previous cost equations and Q2 is the total value of off-balance sheet 
items. Given that we focus on the market power stemming from traditional banking activities, 
marginal cost is still derived from   1, 1 1,/ /itc itc itc itcTC Q a z TC Q   . 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
15
 As is standard in the macroeconomics literature, for Taiwan we use the GDP deflator of China and for 
Netherlands Antilles we use the GDP deflator of Aruba. 
16
 We divide by total assets instead of the number of employees because Bankscope has limited information on 
the number of employees. The related literature follows a similar approach (e.g., Delis, 2012; Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004). 
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Appendix B. Average estimates of market power (weighted by market shares) using the Lerner index 
This table reports average estimates of market power (weighted by market shares) by country and year. Averages are obtained from the bank-level estimates of market power using the Lerner 
index, as this is defined in equation (1). Higher values reflect higher market power (lower competition). 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean 
Afghanistan 
        
0.381 0.237 0.084 0.362 0.299 0.147 0.244 
Albania 
  
0.120 0.321 0.210 0.201 0.184 0.215 0.293 0.274 0.317 0.303 0.318 0.359 0.266 
Algeria 0.153 0.165 0.065 0.153 0.229 0.387 0.244 0.459 0.590 0.648 0.533 0.624 0.528 0.513 0.442 
Andorra 0.255 0.296 0.354 0.359 0.305 0.373 0.459 0.505 0.505 0.507 0.439 0.281 
  
0.377 
Angola 0.275 0.313 0.281 0.397 0.498 0.427 
  
0.412 0.267 0.459 0.492 0.427 0.467 0.412 
Antigua and Barbuda 
   
0.051 0.090 0.123 0.133 
   
0.266 0.334 0.344 
 
0.184 
Argentina 0.217 0.170 0.189 0.218 0.136 0.121 0.019 0.167 0.257 0.285 0.245 0.209 0.325 0.318 0.194 
Armenia 0.182 0.235 0.215 0.188 0.280 0.348 0.375 0.389 0.374 0.364 0.354 0.329 0.226 0.284 0.304 
Australia 0.253 0.248 0.211 0.285 -0.085 0.225 
  
0.250 0.233 0.218 0.165 0.250 0.251 0.219 
Austria 0.147 0.122 0.132 0.146 0.145 0.154 0.189 0.185 0.182 0.174 0.166 0.151 0.206 0.260 0.173 
Azerbaijan 0.533 0.370 0.377 0.535 0.436 0.382 0.375 0.435 0.441 0.388 0.388 0.411 0.380 0.275 0.393 
Bahamas, The 0.159 0.173 0.210 0.272 0.294 0.214 0.321 0.356 0.393 0.388 0.421 0.333 0.391 0.390 0.321 
Bahrain 0.205 0.177 0.175 0.161 0.177 0.239 0.223 0.284 0.265 0.201 0.189 0.232 
  
0.209 
Bangladesh 0.030 -0.033 0.070 0.114 0.134 0.142 0.138 0.164 0.214 0.189 0.211 0.256 0.275 0.339 0.183 
Belarus 0.092 0.209 0.112 0.178 0.120 0.183 0.168 0.150 0.182 0.211 0.186 0.174 0.241 0.246 0.190 
Belgium 0.103 0.138 0.145 0.162 0.166 0.150 0.161 0.158 0.122 0.143 0.071 -0.016 0.079 0.155 0.126 
Bermuda 0.097 0.114 0.118 0.156 0.120 0.194 0.210 0.131 0.269 0.266 0.274 0.128 0.211 0.229 0.190 
Bolivia 0.138 0.186 0.206 0.179 0.194 0.239 0.203 0.145 0.177 0.221 0.238 0.300 0.261 0.274 0.208 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
       
0.215 0.237 0.233 0.256 0.183 0.230 0.251 0.229 
Botswana 0.246 0.307 0.248 0.324 0.326 0.338 0.353 0.337 0.357 0.328 0.269 0.294 0.309 0.336 0.316 
Brazil 0.137 0.160 0.155 0.132 0.144 0.161 0.228 0.219 0.244 0.274 0.278 0.195 0.294 0.259 0.209 
Bulgaria 
    
0.309 0.283 0.339 0.360 0.372 0.378 0.385 0.338 0.323 0.343 0.351 
Burkina Faso 0.277 0.386 0.337 0.270 0.236 0.350 0.348 0.317 0.342 0.306 0.308 0.246 0.266 0.346 0.307 
Cambodia 
   
0.478 0.469 0.337 0.386 0.436 0.436 0.450 0.484 0.517 0.379 0.363 0.430 
Cameroon 
  
0.580 0.499 0.451 0.420 0.385 0.479 0.432 0.426 0.435 0.390 0.314 0.345 0.421 
Canada 0.135 0.108 0.179 0.168 0.166 0.194 0.202 0.229 0.187 0.215 0.190 0.152 0.258 0.304 0.196 
Cayman Islands 0.176 
             
0.176 
Chile 0.161 0.160 0.204 0.206 0.238 0.283 0.194 0.150 0.160 0.228 0.308 0.217 0.411 0.383 0.278 
China 0.405 0.383 0.254 0.275 0.259 0.346 0.379 0.399 0.385 0.390 0.429 0.407 0.417 0.449 0.410 
Colombia 0.146 0.081 0.030 0.085 0.146 0.152 0.244 0.283 0.322 0.279 0.312 0.318 0.341 0.379 0.212 
Costa Rica 0.073 0.084 0.076 0.182 0.185 0.183 0.235 0.220 0.214 0.226 0.213 0.175 0.145 0.222 0.182 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.379 0.386 0.322 0.300 0.263 0.241 0.230 0.273 0.266 0.276 0.303 0.286 0.277 0.263 0.290 
Croatia 0.209 0.167 0.169 0.226 0.202 0.215 0.251 0.271 0.282 0.257 0.268 0.253 0.274 0.301 0.240 
Cuba 0.824 0.761 0.731 0.689 0.569 0.703 0.785 0.787 0.701 0.611 0.470 0.557 0.536 0.651 0.658 
Cyprus 0.155 0.151 0.284 0.107 0.111 0.143 0.176 0.208 0.188 0.253 0.284 0.202 0.233 0.249 0.194 
Czech Republic 0.180 0.158 0.167 0.166 0.162 0.239 0.267 0.298 0.343 0.328 0.328 0.277 0.440 0.444 0.273 
Denmark 0.165 0.175 0.141 0.147 0.251 0.265 0.390 0.180 0.184 0.161 0.135 0.104 0.218 0.213 0.189 
Dominican Republic 0.189 0.180 0.166 0.190 0.190 0.198 0.175 0.115 0.184 0.202 0.220 0.226 0.220 0.266 0.195 
Ecuador 0.050 -0.124 0.297 0.127 0.113 0.185 0.197 0.227 0.268 0.276 0.268 0.241 0.234 0.265 0.210 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
          
0.065 0.065 0.314 0.238 0.236 
El Salvador 0.119 0.169 0.166 0.178 0.244 0.288 0.282 0.304 0.326 0.365 0.359 0.365 0.380 0.447 0.295 
Estonia 0.262 0.029 0.014 0.052 0.204 0.271 0.328 0.347 0.341 0.364 0.323 0.313 0.286 0.373 0.272 
Ethiopia 0.270 0.257 0.344 0.285 0.406 0.331 0.574 0.573 0.574 0.612 0.538 0.616 0.650 0.595 0.515 
Finland 0.055 0.000 0.338 0.354 
  
0.266 0.207 0.174 0.188 0.194 0.118 0.267 0.280 0.206 
France 0.100 0.107 0.128 0.112 0.132 0.152 0.168 0.205 0.220 0.221 0.197 0.172 0.229 0.248 0.161 
Gambia, The 0.495 
 
0.569 0.551 0.552 0.529 0.530 0.437 0.401 0.417 0.272 0.330 0.253 0.317 0.410 
Georgia 
 
0.335 0.362 0.318 0.339 0.341 0.341 0.316 0.351 0.333 0.282 0.262 0.230 0.235 0.304 
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Germany 0.171 0.151 0.164 0.139 0.132 0.157 0.175 0.189 0.185 0.204 0.166 0.153 0.193 0.234 0.171 
Ghana 0.160 0.442 0.419 0.137 
 
0.412 0.414 0.435 0.483 0.442 0.293 0.274 0.241 0.324 0.307 
Greece 0.169 0.201 0.404 0.215 0.000 0.044 0.112 0.136 0.183 0.216 0.173 0.104 0.184 0.151 0.168 
Guatemala 
   
0.088 0.124 0.126 0.186 0.228 0.246 0.251 0.242 0.253 0.248 0.257 0.222 
Haiti 0.123 0.119 0.116 0.172 0.156 0.108 0.224 0.099 0.145 0.171 0.178 0.197 0.183 0.183 0.158 
Honduras 0.338 0.262 0.186 0.129 0.165 0.197 0.256 0.180 0.205 0.240 0.250 0.272 0.233 0.208 0.224 
Hong Kong SAR, 
China 0.238 0.187 0.243 0.273 0.165 0.351 0.389 0.429 0.300 0.276 0.260 0.176 0.299 0.343 0.282 
Hungary 0.153 0.144 0.087 0.122 0.163 0.181 0.226 0.219 0.245 0.243 0.250 0.192 0.223 0.313 0.197 
Iceland 0.167 0.175 0.200 0.068 0.145 0.210 0.231 0.269 0.336 0.363 0.331 0.426 0.337 0.489 0.294 
India 0.121 0.146 0.120 0.158 0.158 0.209 0.244 0.303 0.282 0.266 0.241 0.186 0.194 0.211 0.205 
Indonesia 0.134 0.043 0.030 0.107 0.129 0.160 0.228 0.325 0.248 0.256 0.295 0.311 0.315 0.356 0.206 
Iraq 
          
0.463 0.316 
  
0.389 
Ireland 0.177 0.175 0.253 0.215 0.148 0.135 0.228 0.217 0.144 0.132 0.146 0.146 0.196 0.205 0.185 
Israel 0.153 0.064 0.092 0.124 0.084 0.102 0.116 0.177 0.150 0.198 0.206 0.141 0.197 0.108 0.122 
Italy 0.157 0.200 0.143 0.203 0.183 0.218 0.218 0.179 0.241 0.258 0.240 0.198 0.238 0.236 0.226 
Jamaica 0.128 0.158 0.201 
 
0.289 0.216 0.271 0.233 0.267 0.278 0.271 0.301 0.293 0.334 0.266 
Japan 0.246 0.246 0.259 0.259 0.250 0.230 0.266 0.261 0.282 0.285 0.286 0.242 0.191 0.233 0.252 
Jordan 0.152 0.182 0.173 0.147 0.239 0.237 0.325 0.362 0.490 0.400 0.363 0.349 0.370 0.419 0.307 
Kazakhstan 0.245 0.310 0.306 0.246 0.347 0.366 0.359 0.393 0.356 0.329 0.340 0.243 0.230 0.077 0.296 
Kenya 0.153 0.262 0.270 0.311 0.321 0.318 0.380 0.371 0.361 0.391 0.369 0.344 0.326 0.384 0.338 
Korea, Rep. 0.071 0.115 0.219 0.179 0.266 0.311 0.316 0.331 0.310 0.291 0.271 0.191 0.221 0.258 0.249 
Kuwait 0.092 0.239 0.287 0.299 0.367 0.444 0.517 0.555 0.565 0.470 0.393 
   
0.407 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.176 
  
0.323 0.116 0.371 0.375 0.460 0.365 0.397 0.454 0.319 0.359 0.327 0.348 
Lao PDR 
 
0.232 
   
0.019 0.000 0.252 0.478 0.555 0.669 0.292 0.285 0.353 0.330 
Latvia 0.280 0.214 0.257 0.280 0.271 0.303 0.337 0.356 0.362 0.327 0.305 0.241 0.247 0.227 0.292 
Lebanon 0.168 0.149 0.141 0.144 0.127 0.141 0.163 0.142 0.151 0.149 0.144 0.179 0.190 0.226 0.161 
Libya 
   
0.535 
 
0.576 0.535 0.050 0.401 0.523 0.597 0.691 0.248 
 
0.463 
Lithuania 0.269 0.154 0.242 0.151 0.183 0.217 0.184 0.252 0.289 0.306 0.311 0.245 0.178 0.205 0.231 
Luxembourg 0.103 0.095 0.115 0.134 0.118 0.134 0.151 0.189 0.207 0.198 0.184 0.137 0.242 0.285 0.153 
Macao SAR, China 0.127 0.132 0.166 0.184 0.190 0.290 0.354 0.396 0.366 0.296 0.280 0.325 0.395 0.423 0.300 
Macedonia, FYR 0.498 0.353 0.346 0.297 0.303 0.265 0.317 0.317 0.359 0.359 0.365 0.314 0.261 0.242 0.322 
Madagascar 0.555 0.565 0.507 0.377 0.321 0.356 0.451 0.458 0.471 0.492 0.441 0.337 0.271 0.260 0.419 
Malawi 0.420 0.460 0.443 0.390 0.263 0.357 0.360 0.371 0.390 0.491 0.525 0.438 0.422 0.360 0.395 
Malaysia 0.277 0.246 0.271 0.362 0.344 0.355 0.351 0.352 0.355 0.353 0.360 0.366 0.362 0.409 0.327 
Mali 0.252 0.266 0.298 0.253 0.324 0.307 0.335 0.304 0.311 0.367 0.325 0.304 0.321 0.286 0.306 
Malta 0.214 0.217 0.249 0.226 0.225 0.239 0.273 0.307 0.345 0.339 0.336 0.292 0.310 0.362 0.286 
Mauritania 0.574 0.505 
   
0.313 0.340 0.186 0.463 0.466 0.275 0.277 0.431 0.333 0.369 
Mauritius 0.174 0.198 0.180 0.183 0.204 0.326 0.279 0.324 0.330 0.279 0.262 0.284 0.304 0.399 0.297 
Mexico 0.011 0.002 0.063 0.017 
 
0.280 
  
-0.025 -0.023 
    
0.031 
Moldova 0.353 0.388 0.401 0.413 0.380 0.384 0.408 0.351 0.289 0.341 0.340 0.284 0.222 0.309 0.318 
Mongolia 
  
0.316 0.220 0.272 0.255 0.226 0.263 0.214 0.167 0.200 0.219 0.207 0.190 0.220 
Montenegro 
     
0.000 0.275 0.238 0.161 0.204 0.256 0.205 0.197 0.231 0.216 
Morocco 0.217 0.237 0.217 0.294 0.310 0.329 0.329 0.375 0.305 0.337 0.336 0.359 0.354 0.364 0.311 
Mozambique 0.263 0.236 0.319 0.259 0.279 0.272 0.194 0.238 0.259 0.340 0.368 0.375 0.385 0.356 0.317 
Namibia 
   
0.183 
 
0.023 0.490 0.425 0.270 0.255 0.256 0.249 0.241 0.270 0.259 
Nepal 0.355 0.247 0.319 0.362 0.357 0.348 0.231 0.258 0.273 0.311 0.292 0.333 0.326 0.283 0.302 
Netherlands Antilles 
 
0.114 0.142 0.210 
 
0.130 0.129 
       
0.140 
Netherlands 0.126 0.127 0.143 0.204 0.213 0.109 0.094 0.160 0.154 0.135 0.177 0.183 0.149 0.256 0.157 
New Zealand 0.121 0.085 0.230 0.207 0.226 0.272 0.249 
 
0.200 0.211 0.196 0.173 0.204 
 
0.193 
Nicaragua 
     
0.201 0.220 0.237 0.295 0.327 0.342 0.370 0.379 0.367 0.341 
Niger 0.261 0.399 0.066 0.206 0.145 0.206 0.143 0.233 0.304 0.322 0.265 0.352 0.336 0.328 0.260 
Nigeria 0.228 0.290 0.304 0.276 0.296 0.268 0.275 0.264 0.313 0.317 0.309 0.325 0.195 0.224 0.278 
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Norway 0.169 0.061 0.146 0.157 0.155 0.128 0.159 0.219 0.265 0.230 0.176 0.146 0.266 0.263 0.214 
Oman 0.309 0.274 0.283 0.258 0.301 0.392 0.398 0.428 0.423 0.420 0.378 0.429 0.464 
 
0.359 
Pakistan 0.040 0.023 -0.014 0.045 0.119 0.185 0.259 0.270 0.395 0.368 0.321 0.277 0.288 0.276 0.245 
Panama 0.196 0.134 0.317 0.259 0.255 0.300 0.363 0.322 0.306 0.275 0.320 0.311 0.305 0.313 0.299 
Papua New Guinea 
 
0.250 0.259 0.088 
  
0.401 0.641 0.520 0.504 0.611 0.614 0.530 0.490 0.430 
Paraguay 0.278 0.181 0.104 0.041 0.092 0.015 -0.114 0.052 0.140 0.131 0.133 0.208 0.168 0.216 0.137 
Peru 0.219 0.203 0.184 0.160 0.174 0.259 0.295 0.315 0.357 0.364 0.351 0.387 0.438 0.390 0.280 
Philippines 0.264 0.272 0.177 0.001 0.065 0.214 0.298 0.237 0.239 0.248 0.239 0.193 0.278 0.325 0.248 
Poland 0.170 0.175 0.162 0.165 0.166 0.169 0.137 0.174 0.190 0.239 0.246 0.215 0.232 0.241 0.197 
Portugal 0.119 0.131 0.104 0.168 0.305 0.202 0.230 0.294 0.198 0.162 0.138 0.082 0.087 0.065 0.140 
Qatar 
   
0.242 0.318 0.471 0.522 0.514 0.551 0.435 0.398 0.370 0.375 
 
0.427 
Romania 0.233 0.215 0.214 0.199 0.247 0.190 0.202 0.262 0.236 0.221 0.209 0.224 0.234 0.278 0.228 
Russian Federation 0.207 0.061 0.410 0.377 0.454 0.344 0.310 0.339 0.307 0.297 0.282 0.272 0.239 0.202 0.279 
Rwanda 
    
0.187 0.205 0.257 0.109 0.004 0.320 0.352 0.343 0.249 0.343 0.252 
San Marino 0.185 0.262 0.400 0.397 0.328 0.335 0.435 0.506 0.504 0.460 0.382 0.195 
  
0.397 
Saudi Arabia 0.263 0.261 0.254 0.247 0.311 0.405 0.490 0.501 0.490 0.488 0.340 0.225 0.362 0.288 0.342 
Senegal 0.356 0.428 0.351 0.344 0.364 0.352 0.345 0.342 0.330 0.340 0.307 0.327 0.297 0.281 0.335 
Serbia 
     
0.374 0.472 0.362 0.336 0.217 0.249 0.228 0.234 0.176 0.264 
Seychelles 
 
0.198 
     
0.508 0.559 0.567 0.595 0.594 0.377 0.528 0.501 
Sierra Leone 0.190 0.400 
 
0.646 0.535 0.481 0.474 0.519 0.472 0.386 0.287 0.188 0.247 0.328 0.409 
Singapore 0.248 0.232 0.362 0.353 0.297 0.230 
 
0.414 0.361 0.309 0.331 0.376 0.489 0.438 0.351 
Slovak Republic 0.092 0.032 0.029 0.142 0.158 0.183 0.216 0.246 0.267 0.291 0.284 0.304 0.322 0.390 0.219 
Slovenia 0.214 0.213 0.224 0.238 0.188 0.210 0.214 0.252 0.266 0.252 0.249 0.184 0.237 0.269 0.230 
South Africa 0.105 0.163 0.167 0.179 0.204 0.300 0.211 0.177 0.155 0.233 0.222 0.199 0.217 0.229 0.200 
Spain 0.130 0.161 0.228 0.181 0.179 0.196 0.238 0.275 0.242 0.246 0.229 0.207 0.292 0.305 0.242 
Sri Lanka 0.149 0.177 0.114 0.102 0.094 0.150 0.224 0.210 0.210 0.196 0.171 0.146 0.171 0.232 0.174 
Sudan 0.395 0.266 0.246 0.258 0.145 0.317 0.180 0.291 0.257 0.277 0.171 0.223 0.193 0.214 0.236 
Sweden 0.186 0.168 0.156 0.182 0.183 0.169 0.206 0.277 0.234 0.224 0.178 0.160 0.223 0.244 0.206 
Switzerland 0.168 0.132 0.126 0.156 0.124 0.165 0.179 0.180 0.122 0.125 0.039 0.036 0.129 0.179 0.130 
Syrian Arab Republic 
        
0.000 0.064 0.309 0.568 0.569 0.567 0.498 
Taiwan 
   
0.159 0.165 0.227 0.349 0.283 0.307 0.278 0.248 0.218 0.294 0.342 0.282 
Tanzania 
      
0.471 0.439 0.390 0.423 0.395 0.392 0.357 0.343 0.385 
Thailand 0.171 0.011 0.045 0.106 0.148 0.233 0.290 0.375 0.375 0.288 0.289 0.334 0.369 0.389 0.257 
Togo 0.111 0.191 0.216 0.446 0.225 0.129 0.276 0.315 0.259 0.307 0.259 0.282 0.244 0.344 0.242 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.195 0.193 0.231 0.266 0.284 0.302 0.360 0.347 0.309 0.321 0.338 0.345 0.313 0.442 0.310 
Tunisia 0.562 0.557 0.458 0.302 0.292 0.267 0.189 0.208 0.221 0.285 0.295 0.323 0.331 0.346 0.291 
Turkey 0.022 0.034 0.143 0.046 -0.017 0.112 0.190 0.240 0.286 0.226 0.227 0.209 0.335 0.320 0.192 
Uganda 
          
0.401 0.360 0.368 0.341 0.364 
Ukraine 0.229 0.269 0.316 0.211 0.229 0.182 0.245 0.233 0.221 0.243 0.220 0.314 0.250 0.214 0.241 
United Arab Emirates 0.307 0.298 0.314 0.295 0.340 0.462 0.507 0.516 0.516 0.359 0.346 0.372 0.453 0.468 0.405 
United Kingdom 0.182 0.184 0.177 0.243 0.110 0.169 0.282 0.292 0.254 0.241 0.236 0.103 0.294 0.308 0.228 
United States 0.239 0.229 0.252 0.224 0.266 0.332 0.355 0.321 0.304 0.268 0.227 0.239 0.344 0.352 0.288 
Uruguay 0.072 0.076 0.073 0.097 0.037 0.248 0.013 0.241 0.090 0.190 0.269 0.363 0.181 0.250 0.152 
Uzbekistan 0.378 0.307 0.301 0.371 0.364 0.321 0.223 0.181 0.239 0.275 0.283 0.229 0.212 0.248 0.264 
Venezuela, RB 0.291 0.283 0.217 0.182 0.226 0.301 0.327 0.343 0.276 0.293 0.281 0.263 0.265 0.306 0.270 
Vietnam 0.379 0.346 0.314 0.345 0.264 0.292 0.273 0.349 0.336 0.282 0.277 0.208 0.198 0.205 0.256 
Yemen, Rep. 
        
0.055 0.226 0.231 0.200 0.272 0.242 0.228 
Zambia 0.047 0.172 0.117 0.194 0.234 0.224 0.101 0.233 0.296 0.340 0.340 0.299 0.337 0.288 0.257 
Zimbabwe 
            
0.297 0.299 0.298 
Mean 0.176 0.163 0.204 0.192 0.207 0.244 0.268 0.262 0.252 0.247 0.223 0.212 0.260 0.278 0.266 
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Figure 1 
Evolution of the average Lerner indices by year 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Foreign bank presence and banks’ market power 
 
 
 
